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ABSTRACT

Traditionally, radio spectrum has been statically allocated to wireless service providers
(WSPs). Regulators, like FCC, give wireless service providers exclusive long term licenses
for using specific range of frequencies in particular geographic areas. Moreover, restrictions
are imposed on the technologies to be used and the services to be provided. The lack of flexibility in static spectrum allocation constrains the ability to make use of new technologies
and the ability to redeploy the spectrum to higher valued uses, thereby resulting in inefficient
spectrum utilization [23, 38, 42, 62, 67]. These limitations have motivated a paradigm shift
from static spectrum allocation towards a more ‘liberalized’ notion of spectrum management
in which secondary users can borrow idle spectrum from primary spectrum licensees, without
causing harmful interference to the latter- a notion commonly referred to as dynamic spectrum access (DSA) or open spectrum access [3], [82]. Cognitive radio [30, 47], empowered
by Software Defined Radio (SDR) [81], is poised to promote the efficient use of spectrum by
adopting this open spectrum approach.
In this dissertation, we first address the problem of dynamic channel (spectrum) access
by a set of cognitive radio enabled nodes, where each node acting in a selfish manner tries
to access and use as many channels as possible, subject to the interference constraints. We
model the dynamic channel access problem as a modified Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game.
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In our model, each node negotiates with the other nodes to obtain an agreeable sharing rule
of the available channels, such that, no two interfering nodes use the same channel. We solve
the bargaining game by finding Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) strategies of the
nodes. First, we consider finite horizon version of the bargaining game and investigate its
SPNE strategies that allow each node to maximize its utility against the other nodes (opponents). We then extend these results to the infinite horizon bargaining game. Furthermore,
we identify Pareto optimal equilibria of the game for improving spectrum utilization. The
bargaining solution ensures that no node is starved of channels.
The spectrum that a secondary node acquires comes to it at a cost. Thus it becomes
important to study the ‘end system’ perspective of such a cost, by focusing on its implications.
Specifically, we consider the problem of incentivizing nodes to provide the service of routing
using the acquired spectrum. In this problem, each secondary node having a certain capacity
incurs a cost for routing traffic through it. Secondary nodes will not have an incentive to relay
traffic unless they are compensated for the costs they incur in forwarding traffic. We propose
a path auction scheme in which each secondary node announces its cost and capacity to the
routing mechanism, both of which are considered as private information known only to the
node. We design a route selection mechanism and a pricing function that can induce nodes to
reveal their cost and capacity honestly (making our auction truthful), while minimizing the
payment that needs to be given to the nodes (making our auction optimal). By considering
capacity constraint of the nodes, we explicitly support multiple path routing. For deploying
our path auction based routing mechanism in DSA networks, we provide polynomial time
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algorithms to find the optimal route over which traffic should be routed and to compute the
payment that each node should receive.
All our proposed algorithms have been evaluated via extensive simulation experiments.
These results help to validate our design philosophy and also illustrate the effectiveness of
our solution approach.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”[16]– Sir Arthur C.
Clarke. Wireless communications today indeed portray characteristics of magic– people
from far corners of the world can communicate with each other without any apparent link
between them; remote devices can be controlled without the need of any physical connection.
There are plethora of examples today that would astound someone not familiar with wireless
communication technology.
Wireless communications is enabled by the use of electromagnetic spectrum, which has
arguably become one of the most precious resources of the modern era. Mobile communications, satellite television, public safety systems, wireless local area networks (WLAN),
global positioning system (GPS)– all substantiate the dependency of modern society on this
resource.
Similar to any natural resource, like oil and natural gas, land, the usage of spectrum
also needs to be managed. This is usually done by a government subsidized agency in various countries. For example, in 1934, the US Congress created the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to oversee telecommunications. Its responsibilities include management
of electromagnetic spectrum within the United States. Traditionally, radio spectrum man-
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agement has followed a ‘command-and-control’ approach– regulators like FCC give wireless
service providers exclusive rights of using a particular range of frequencies in a particular
geographic area. Moreover, restrictions are imposed on the technologies to be used and the
services to be provided. Portions of the spectrum managed in this manner are termed as
licensed spectrum. The ‘command-and-control’ approach results in a static spectrum allocation that is managed manually– geographic areas have to be surveyed and frequency
and bandwidth parameters chosen appropriately for each license holder to minimize overall
interference.
Broadcast radio and television services, for example, operate using licensed spectrum in
most countries, thereby following the command-and-control approach. They were among
the first commercially deployed applications using electromagnetic spectrum. Radio and
television services are primarily characterized as one-way communication systems. Cellular
telephony networks, introduced in 1980s, marked the first widespread use of two-way communication devices. Much of the spectrum used by cellular telephony networks also fall into
the category of licensed spectrum usage. Another example of an application that operates
using licensed spectrum is the GPS.
Undoubtedly, services provisioned using licensed spectrum have had far reaching impacts
on all walks of human lives. However, the ‘static’ nature of the ‘command-and-control’
approach has resulted in inefficient spectrum utilization over the years. While the entire
radio spectrum from 6 kHz to 300 GHz is allocated, at any given point in space and time,
much of the spectrum remains unused [23, 38, 42, 43, 62, 67], resulting in the existence of
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Figure 1.1: White spaces in spectrum usage (Courtesy: Shared Spectrum Company)

‘spectrum holes’ (also called white spaces) in the allocated spectrum. A snapshot of spectrum
usage and existence of white spaces is shown in Figure 1.1. The problem of static spectrum
allocation also worsens due to the modification of old technologies and adoption of new ones.
For example, the allocation of 6 MHz per TV channel in the United States was based on
the old analog NTSC system even though better quality video can be now broadcasted with
almost 50% less spectrum per channel [9]. After completion of the analog to digital TV
transition in the US, most of the spectrum from 54 MHz–698 MHz (channels 2 to 51), which
was used for analog TV broadcast, remains unused. These limitations of static spectrum
allocation motivated regulatory bodies like FCC to rethink the way in which spectrum is
managed and seek a more dynamic means of allocating spectrum leading to the concept of
unlicensed spectrum usage, which we discuss next.
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1.1

Unlicensed Spectrum and Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA)

Intuitively, spectrum utilization can be significantly improved by making it possible for
a user to access spectrum unoccupied by its license holder at a given location and time.
This is essentially the concept of unlicensed spectrum access. In contrast to static spectrum
allocation, for successful sharing of unlicensed spectrum, a dynamic and distributed approach
is required. Such a wireless ecosystem would be habited by primarily two classes of spectrum
users. The first are the primary users who already possess FCC licenses to use particular
frequencies. The second class comprises of the unlicensed users, denoted as the secondary
users. Primary users would always have full access to their spectrum at their discretion.
Secondary users can use the spectrum owned by the primary spectrum licensees, without
causing harmful interference to the latter, i.e., in an opportunistic manner. This is known as
dynamic spectrum access (DSA) or open spectrum access [3], [82]. Cognitive radio [30, 47],
empowered by Software Defined Radio (SDR) [81], is poised to promote the efficient use of
spectrum by adopting this open spectrum approach.
The first step in the paradigm shift from licensed spectrum management towards allowing
unlicensed usage was taken in 1985, when the FCC allowed use of direct sequence spread
spectrum (DSSS) technology for communications in the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical
(ISM) bands at 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz, and 5.8 GHz in the US. The ISM bands have played a key
role in facilitating development of various wireless communication systems, including wireless
local area networks and cordless phones. More recently, in November 2008, FCC issued a
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decision that made the TV white spaces left behind after the analog to DTV transition to be
available for unlicensed use. Unlicensed radio transmitters would be able to operate in these
white spaces without interfering with other devices. These steps taken by FCC mark the
beginning of an era in which devices using unlicensed spectrum will far outnumber devices
using licensed spectrum.
Cognitive Radio: Cognitive radio [46], [47], inclusive of software-defined radio, has been
proposed as the means to promote the efficient use of the spectrum by exploiting the existence of spectrum holes. Software-defined radio, is a multi-band radio that supports multiple air interfaces and protocols and is reconfigurable through software or general purpose
microprocessors[45]. Cognitive radio, built on a software radio platform, is capable of autonomous reconfiguration by learning from and adapting to the communication environment.

1.2

Unlicensed Spectrum Sharing problem

We consider spectrum to be divided into channels. Here we use the term ‘channel’ broadly.
A channel can be a frequency band with certain bandwidth, a collection of spreading codes
in a code division multiple access (CDMA) network, or a set of tones in an orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system. We assume that cross-channel interference
is negligible. Thus, a secondary user transmitting over an available channel does not interfere
with primary users using other channels.
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If a secondary user (node) uses spectrum without coordinating with the others, then it
may cause harmful interference and degrade overall spectrum usage. Nodes in close proximity interfere with each other and cannot use the same channel concurrently, while well
separated nodes can reuse the same channel. Each node therefore has to use channels that
are orthogonal from its interferers. Such orthogonal channel assignment can be done with
either of the following two objectives.

1. Optimizing System Utility: Nodes share channels, such that, system wide utility
is maximized based on some predefined utility function (e.g., [13, 58, 63]), regardless
of individual benefits. This type of optimization techniques primarily corresponds
to collaborative schemes among nodes usually deployed by the same network service
provider.
2. Optimizing Individual Benefits: Nodes share channels, such that, individual benefits are maximized (e.g., [34] [54]). Nodes are considered as rational entities competing
with each other to maximize self-gain in a non-collaborative manner. The nodes, for
example, can correspond to broadcast access points deployed by competing wireless
service providers. By using more channels each provider may intend to support more
customers for maximizing its revenue.

When the nodes accessing spectrum are self-gain-motivated rational entities, each would
try to to maximize its utility by accessing and using as many channels as possible from
the set of orthogonal channels not being used by any of the primary incumbents. The
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channels that a node selects is, however, subject to the following constraint– nodes within
the interference range of each other have to use orthogonal channels to minimize interference.
Thus, the nodes will have to agree upon a sharing rule of the channels among themselves.
The fundamental question that needs to be answered is- how many and which channels each
node should access to maximize its gain, given that all nodes are selfish. Clearly, from the
above discussion, it is important to study the competition for spectrum among nodes in an
interference aware context and investigate self-enforcing spectrum sharing strategies of the
nodes, which have not been addressed in previous works.

1.3

The Incentive based Routing Problem

Primary owners of spectrum licenses are mostly numerous, independent self-interested parties. Thus, to motivate such entities to allow usage of their idle spectrum for secondary
use, an incentive, generally in the form of monetary benefit, has to given to them. Such
economic considerations have been reflected in recent research [37, 79, 80], which proposes
various pricing schemes.

1.3.1

The Routing Problem– from an Economic Perspective

Since secondary users acquire spectrum from the primaries by paying for the same, the former
can also be considered as self-gain-motivated independent entities, introducing characteristics
of an economy to the secondary user regime. In other words, incentives have to be given
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to the secondary users to provide services, such as routing, to outside entities. To forward
traffic, each secondary node would incur a cost because of using the spectrum it has acquired
by paying a price. Moreover, using the acquired spectrum, each node can sustain a certain
capacity. Clearly, secondary nodes will not have an incentive to relay traffic unless they are
compensated for the costs they incur in forwarding traffic. Also, for a routing mechanism to
be stable, the amount of traffic that a node forwards should not exceed its capacity.
The routing problem: For a flow from a source s to a destination d in a DSA network, the
routing problem (from an economic perspective) is to find a path (or a set of paths) from s
to d, that has sufficient capacity to route the given flow, and using which the total payment
that needs to be made to relaying nodes is minimized.

1.3.2

Difficulty in Solving the Problem

The complexity in solving the routing problem lies in the fact that the routing mechanism
is not aware of the actual cost and capacity of a node. Both cost and capacity of a node
are considered as its private information, which the node is responsible for revealing to
the routing mechanism. This gives the nodes an opportunity to lie about its cost and/or
capacity hoping for an extra profit. For example, a node might understate its cost hoping to
attract sufficient additional traffic that countervails its lower than truthful cost announced,
or exaggerate its cost that might increase the payment made to the node sufficiently to
compensate for any resulting decrease in traffic. Moreover, a node might exaggerate its
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capacity hoping to receive additional traffic, which the node may not have sufficient capacity
to route, but results in increase in payment made to the node. As will become evident
later, there are situations where a node might even expect an extra profit by understating
its capacity.

1.3.3

Limitations of Past Work

Most past works have focused on the cost perspective alone and does not consider capacity
constraint in their framework [25, 31, 55]. These works consider finding a least cost path
(LCP) from s to d with each agent (a node or an edge) having a per packet cost for relaying
traffic. To induce the agents to reveal their costs truthfully, the pricing schemes in these
works are based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) class of mechanisms [17, 29, 69]. It is
worth emphasizing here that the focus of these works is find a path with the least cost, which
need not be the path that requires the least payment. Minimization of the payment to be
made is more attractive to an end user, because price is the actual out-of-pocket expense the
end user has to pay. The authors in [39] consider the capacity constraint but do not enforce
the nodes to report their capacity truthfully. In [64], the authors also consider the capacity
constraint of the nodes. However, to enforce truthful capacity reporting their scheme requires
tamper-proof hardware or cryptographic-receipt-based software to be installed in the nodes.
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1.4

Solution Approach and Contributions

We first address the question of how many and which channels each selfish secondary node
should access in order to maximize its gain. In order to answer this question, we model the
channel access problem as a bargaining game, where nodes ‘haggle’ with each other over
their share of channels. The solution to the bargaining game corresponds to self–enforcing
equilibrium strategies of the nodes in ‘demanding’ and ‘accepting’ their share of channels
which optimizes the utility of each node against all other nodes.
Since the channels that each secondary node acquires comes to it at a cost, these nodes
will have to be provided with incentives to provide services such as routing to outside entities.
Thus, after investigating the equilibrium share of channels of the nodes, we will delve into
economic considerations of providing incentives to nodes to use the channels acquired by
them in providing the service of routing to outside entities.

1.4.1

The Spectrum Bargaining Game

We model the competition for spectrum among the nodes using non-cooperative game theory.
Specifically, we model the problem of agreeing upon a sharing rule of the channels among the
nodes as a Rubinstein-Ståhl [60] [66] bargaining game. In our model, each node “bargains”
with the other nodes (opponents) in the network regarding its “share” (how many and which)
of the channels. In the finite horizon version of the game, nodes bargain at most for a given
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time. If the nodes can decide upon a sharing rule of the channels within the given time,
each gets its respective share of the channels as per the sharing rule. Otherwise, each node
gets zero channels. In the infinite horizon game, bargaining among the nodes go on until
the nodes can agree upon a distribution of the channels. Notice that, until the nodes agree
upon the sharing rule, none of the nodes can start data communication. Thus, “waiting” for
the bargaining outcome also costs the nodes. We consider this cost by discounting future
payoff of the nodes. This discounting represents the patience of the nodes in waiting for the
bargaining outcome.
We solve the bargaining game by finding Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)
strategies of the nodes. The SPNE strategies that we derive comprise a set of strategies
such that, no node in no subgame can deviate from its strategy and thereby gain from the
deviation. Formally, the key contribution of our work on spectrum sharing can considered
as follows.
• We model the problem of dynamic spectrum access, in which the nodes have to agree
upon a sharing rule of the channels among themselves, as a Rubinstein-Ståhl [60, 66]
bargaining game.
• We investigate finite horizon version of the game and identify SPNE strategies of the
nodes, such that, using their SPNE strategies each node can optimize its utility against
all its opponents in any subgame of the bargaining game1 . In other words, considering
nodes to be rational, each node can play its SPNE strategy in the very first period
1

Note that, the original game can also be considered a subgame of itself.
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of the game to decide on the sharing rule and start data communication. The finite
horizon game represents situations when an outside entity limits the time for which
the nodes can bargain.
• We also study the infinite horizon bargaining game and derive SPNE strategies of the
nodes in this game. The infinite horizon version of the game models situations when
there is no outside entity to limit the time for which the nodes bargain, so that, nodes
can go on bargaining until they can agree upon a sharing rule.
• We identify Pareto optimal equilibrium strategies of the nodes to maximize spectrum
utilization. In other words, the spectrum sharing rule that the nodes obtain using their
equilibrium strategies is efficient, in the sense that, the channel allocation of a node
cannot be improved without hurting the share of another.
• The bargaining solution that we derive is such that no node gets starved of channels
when the nodes play their equilibrium strategies. This is an important criteria when
analyzing any competition model.
• We conduct simulations to study how the ‘self-gain’ maximizing strategy of the players
affect system wide performance. This study reveals how competition for spectrum
among nodes influences spectrum usage from a global perspective. We also study how
the relative utility of the nodes is affected by their patience factors.

12

• In our model, each node negotiates with its opponents to agree upon the sharing rule,
without requiring any centralized controller. Our algorithm thus works in a distributed
manner making the system scalable.

Deriving SPNE strategies of the spectrum bargaining game is fundamentally different and
much more difficult than solving the conventional Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game. This
is because of two primary reasons– (i) spectrum can be spatially reused concurrently; two
interfering players must not use the same channels simultaneously yet well-separated players
can, and, (ii) players can only use whole channels, not fractional channels. We consider both
constraints while analyzing the spectrum bargaining game.

1.4.2

Path Auction based Routing Mechanism

As mentioned before, to forward traffic, each secondary node incurs a cost because of using
the spectrum it has acquired by paying a price. Moreover, using the acquired spectrum, each
node can sustain a certain capacity. Clearly, secondary nodes will not have an incentive to
relay traffic unless they are compensated for the costs they incur in forwarding traffic.
In this dissertation, we adopt the approach of Bayesian based algorithmic mechanism
design for designing an optimal routing mechanism that minimizes the payment to be made
to the nodes while theoretically ensuring that no node has any incentive to dishonestly
declare its cost and/or capacity. This is in sharp contrast to previous works that either
do not consider the capacity constraint of the nodes, or consider the capacity constraint
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but do not enforce truthful capacity reporting, or require special hardware/software to be
installed in the nodes for truthful revelation of a node’s private information. To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the first work that enforces truthfulness on multiple parameters of a
node, without requiring any tamper proof software/hardware.
Our routing mechanism is comprised of two components– a) route selection function,
which determines the route(s) that requires the least expected payment. We refer to such
a route as the the Expected Least Paid Route (ELPR), and, b) pricing function, which
determines the payment to be made to each node. The focus of our work is to design these
two functions. Formally, the key contributions of our work can be considered as follows.

• We propose a path auction based routing mechanism in which nodes announce their cost
and capacity, based on which a multi-path route is chosen and payments are made to the
nodes. The route selection mechanism and the payment function ensure that all nodes can
maximize their profit by truthfully reporting their cost and capacity, while the payment
that needs to be made to the nodes is minimized.
• In addition to theoretically deriving the functions that determine the route selection and
the payments to be made, we provide polynomial time algorithms for deploying the routing
mechanism in DSA networks.
• We model cost of a node and its capacity as random variables. This serves a two-fold
purpose– a) it helps tame the uncertainty regarding the actual cost and capacity of a
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node; and, b) it helps reflect the heterogenous nature of the nodes in a DSA network in
terms of both space and time variation of the cost and capacity of nodes.

In our work on routing, we assume that the interference issue has been taken care of by the
spectrum allocation mechanism (such as the bargaining solution), so that interfering nodes
have been allocated different channels. Thus, interference is not an issue at the routing layer.
In addition, even though a node is only allowed to transmit over channels it has acquired, it
can tune to any channel for reception.
Our work is partly based on the optimal auction theory by Myerson [48]. There are
however two major differences with Myerson’s work that makes our problem significantly
more difficult to tame. First, in Myerson’s work, each bidder is associated with only his
valuation (cost) of the object for sale, while in our scenario, each bidder (node) is associated
with a cost and a capacity. This increases the dimensionality of the problem. Secondly, in
Myerson’s theory, the bidders submit their bids independently, and a single bidder emerges
as the winner to whom the object is allocated. On the other hand, in our work, though
the nodes bid, the winner(s) corresponds to path(s). The nodes are then allocated traffic in
the context of the paths they belong to. Based on the above discussion, clearly, the results
in Myerson’s work cannot be directly applied to our problem. Thus, our work can also be
considered to be expanding the scope of optimal auction design in specific and of mechanism
design in general.
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1.5

Structure of this Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses important game
theoretic concepts used in this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we discuss related research in the
area of spectrum sharing and also in the area providing incentives to nodes for stimulating
cooperation in routing traffic. Chapter 4 first models the channel access problem as a
bargaining game, assuming that all nodes are within the interference range of each other.
Such a scenario often occurs in urban areas where the distribution of the secondary users is
very dense. Chapter 5 extends the bargaining model developed in Chapter 4 by relaxing the
assumption on interference constraint. The bargaining solution in Chapters 4 and 5 derive
equilibrium strategies of the nodes in ‘demanding’ and ‘accepting’ their share of channels,
which primarily answers the question of how many and which channels each node should
access in order to maximize its gain. However, each channel that a node acquires comes
at a cost and the node has to pay a price for acquiring it. In Chapter 6 we study the
‘end system’ perspective of such a cost by specifically focussing on the problem of providing
incentives to nodes for routing traffic in DSA networks. This chapter presents a route
selection mechanism and a pricing function that can induce nodes to reveal their cost and
capacity honestly (making our auction truthful), while minimizing the payment that needs
to be given to the nodes (making our auction optimal). Chapter 7 evaluates the performance
of all our proposed algorithms via extensive simulations. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
A GAME THEORY PRIMER
Game theory is a field of applied mathematics that aims to model situations in which multiple
participants interact or affect each other’s outcomes. The concepts of game theory provide a
language to formulate, analyze, and understand strategic scenarios, and furthermore, predict
the outcome of complex interactions among rational entities.
Game theory has been used to analyze problems in economics, political science, sociology,
biology and more recently in Computer Science. In this chapter, we formally review some
of the fundamental definitions and concepts in game theory [27, 55, 56, 57] that have been
used in our analysis.

2.1

Games, Strategies and Payoffs

A game consists of a set N of players, {1, 2, · · · , n}. Each player i ∈ N has his own set of
possible strategies, Si . To play the game, each player i selects a strategy si ∈ Si . The vector
of strategies selected by the players comprises the strategy profile, s = (s1 , · · · , sn ). Also,
S = ×i∈N Si denotes the set of all possible ways in which players can pick strategies. The
vector of strategies s ∈ S selected by the players determine the outcome for each player. To
formulate the game, a preference ordering on the possible outcomes needs to be specified for
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each player. This is accomplished by defining, for each player i, a payoff function ui : S → R.
Next, we formally define a game.
Definition 2.1. A game in strategic or normal form is denoted by the triple (N , S, u), where,
• N = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the set of players.
• S = ×i∈N Si denotes the set of all possible ways in which players can pick strategies. It
is the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces Si of all players.
• u(s) = (u1 (s), · · · , un (s)) is the n-tuple of payoff functions. ui (s) is the payoff function of player i that gives his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for each profile s =
(s1 , · · · , sn ).
The most fundamental assumption in game theory is that all players in the game are
rational. A rational player chooses actions to maximize his payoff. In case the game is
not deterministic, a player chooses to maximize his expected utility (payoffs). The idea
of maximizing the expected payoff was justified by the seminal work of von Neumann and
Morgenstern in 1944 [53]. Since rational players tend to maximize their payoff, they can be
regarded as being selfish. It worth emphasizing that being selfish does not necessarily mean
“hurting” other players.

2.1.1

Dominant Strategy Solution

After a game is formulated, it is interesting to study whether it is possible to predict how the
game can be played. Predicting the strategy of the players (and consequently the outcome
of the game), is referred to as solving the game. This leads us to the notion of a dominant
strategy solution.

18

Let us denote the tuple (s1 , · · · , si−1 , si+1 . · · · , sn ) by s−i , and the tuple (s1 , · · · , sn ) by
(si , s−i ). We can then define the following two important concepts.
Definition 2.2. Strategy si ∈ Si is a dominant strategy for player i if for every alternate
strategy s0i ∈ Si , it holds that,
ui (si , s−i ) ≥ ui (s0i , s−i ),

∀s−i ∈ S−i

(2.1)

Strategy si is the unique dominant strategy for player i if the inequality holds strictly.
Definition 2.3. A strategy vector s ∈ S is a dominant strategy solution, if for each
player i, and each alternate strategy vector s0 ∈ S, it holds that,
ui (si , s0−i ) ≥ ui (s0i , s0−i )

(2.2)

Strategy profile s is the unique dominant strategy solution of the game if the inequality holds
strictly.

In other words, if each player has a best strategy, independent of the strategies played
by the other players then we say that the game has a dominant strategy solution. Having
a dominant strategy for each player is a stringent requirement for a game and only few
games satisfy it. One game which has a (unique) dominant strategy solution is the famous
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” game. We will discuss it next to illustrate the concept of finding a
dominant strategy solution.
Prisoner’s Dilemma: In this game, two people (A and B) have been arrested for
a crime. However, the police lack sufficient evidence to convict either suspect and thus
need them to testify against each other. They have been put in different cells and cannot
communicate with each other. The police have asked each to testify against the other. If
one testifies (i.e., defects) and the other does not (i.e., cooperates), then the one that defects
will be released and given a reward for testifying, while the one that cooperates will go to
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Table 2.1: Payoff matrix: Prisoner’s Dilemma
HH
HH B Cooperate Defect
A
HH
Cooperate
(1, 1)
(−1, 2)
Defect
(2, −1)
(0, 0)

jail. If neither testifies, both prisoners will be released and no rewards will be given. If
both testifies against the other, both will go to prison, but will however collect rewards for
testifying. Also, in this game, both players will have to simultaneously choose between the
two options. The payoff of the players for the different strategy profiles have been tabulated
in Figure 2.1.
If both players cooperate, they get 1 each. If both defects, each gets 0. If one cooperates
while the other does not, the former is punished and gets a payoff of -1, while the latter
is rewarded resulting in a payoff of 2. Notice that, each prisoner will do strictly better
by defecting, regardless of what the other one does. Thus, the unique dominant strategy
solution of this game is for both prisoners to defect. It can also be noted that cooperation
would actually lead to a better payoff of both players (1 each). However, self-gain-motivated
behavior of the players leads to the inefficient outcome with payoffs 0.

2.1.2

Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

As noted earlier, only few games possess dominant strategy solutions. Thus, it is desirable
to find a less stringent and more widely applicable solution concept. This leads us to the
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discussion of a Nash equilibrium, which was proposed by John Nash in his seminal work [50]
in 1950.
Definition 2.4. A strategy profile s ∈ S is said to be a Nash equilibrium, if for all players
i, and each alternate strategy vector s0i ∈ Si , we have that
ui (si , s−i ) ≥ ui (s0i , s−i )

(2.3)

A Nash equilibrium is strict if each player has a unique best response to his opponents’
strategies, i.e., the above inequality is strict for all i and all s0i 6= si .
Thus, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile, such that, each player’s strategy is an optimal response to all the other players’ strategies. In other words, no player i can unilaterally
change his chosen strategy from si to s0i and thereby improve his payoff. Such a solution
can also be said to be self-enforcing and stable, in the sense that, given that the players are
playing such a solution, it is in every player’s best interest not to change his strategy. Notice
that, definition (2.4) essentially defines a pure strategy equilibrium, since it considers that
each player deterministically plays a strategy. Furthermore, it can also be observed that a
strict Nash equilibrium has to be a pure strategy equilibrium.
Clearly, from definitions (2.3) and (2.4), we can say that a dominant strategy solution is
a Nash equilibrium. For example, the (unique) Nash equilibrium in the Prisoner’s dilemma
game corresponds to both players choosing to defect, since in this case neither player can
unilaterally change his strategy to improve his payoff. However, in general, Nash equilibria
need not be unique. Coordination games, such as Battle of the Sexes, can have multiple
Nash equilibria.
Battle of the Sexes: In this game, a couple needs to decide how to spend their evening.
Each player considers two possibilities– going to a soccer game or a ballet. The husband (H)
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Table 2.2: Payoff matrix: Battle of the sexes
HH
HHW Soccer Ballet
H
HH
Soccer (2, 1) (0, 0)
Ballet (0, 0) (1, 2)

prefers soccer while the wife (W) prefers ballet. However, both prefers spending the evening
together rather than separately. The payoff matrix of the game is shown in Table (2.2).
This game has three Nash equilibria– two using pure strategies and one using mixed
strategy. We will discuss the mixed strategy equilibrium in Section (2.1.3). If both choose
to go to the same event, neither can improve his or her utility by unilaterally changing his or
her strategy. Thus, the two pure strategy equilibria correspond to both attending the same
event, with payoffs (2, 1) or (1, 2), depending on whether they both go to the soccer game
or the ballet.

2.1.3

Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Though a pure strategy equilibrium defines a stable solution of a game, all games need not
possess one. This leads us to study mixed strategy equilibria. A mixed strategy for player
i, say σi , is a probability distribution over the set of his pure strategies Si . We will denote
the space of probability distributions over Si by Σi . Each player’s distribution is assumed
to be statistically independent from those of his opponents. The payoffs in a mixed strategy
profile are the expected values over the corresponding pure strategy payoffs. When dealing
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with mixed strategy equilibria, it is considered that the players are risk neutral and each
player seeks to maximize his expected payoff. Formally, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.5. A mixed strategy profile σ ∗ is said to be a Nash equilibrium, if for all
players i,
∗
∗
ui (σi∗ , σ−i
) ≥ ui (si , σ−i
),
∀si ∈ Si
(2.4)

In 1951, Nash proved the following important result when the strategies of the players
are extended by incorporating randomization [51].
Theorem 2.1. If a game has a finite set of players and a finite set of strategies, then it
necessarily possesses a Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies.

It is easy to see that if a player uses a mixed strategy in a Nash equilibrium, then he must
be indifferent between choosing all pure strategies to which he assigns a positive probability.
Let us now consider a game which has no pure strategy equilibrium and find a mixed strategy
solution to the game.
Matching Pennies: Two players, 1 and 2, have a penny each, and has to simultaneously
announce heads (H) or tails (T). If the announcement matches, player 1 wins and player 2
loses. However, if the announcement differs, player 2 wins and player 1 loses. The payoff
matrix is shown in Table (2.3), where 1 indicates win and -1 indicates loss.
Clearly, the game does not have a pure strategy equilibrium, since for all 4 strategy
profiles, one player can always improve his payoff by deviating unilaterally. Let us find a
mixed strategy equilibrium of the game. Let p1 and p2 be the probability of player 1 and 2
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Table 2.3: Payoff matrix: Matching Pennies
HH
HH 2
H
T
1
HH
H (1, −1) (−1, 1)
T (−1, 1) (1, −1)

playing H respectively. Now, player 1’s indifference between choosing H and T implies that,
(1) · p2 + (−1) · (1 − p2 ) = (−1) · p2 + (1) · (1 − p2 )
Solving, we get p2 = 1/2. Similarly, for player 2 to be indifferent between choosing H and
T, we must have,
(−1) · p1 + (1) · (1 − p1 ) = (1) · p1 + (−1) · (1 − p1 )
Solving, we get p1 = 1/2. Thus, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game is for
each player to play each strategy with probability 1/2.
In a similar fashion, it can be shown that the mixed strategy equilibrium of the battle
of the sexes game is for H to choose the soccer game with probability 2/3 and choose the
ballet with probability 1/3, while the strategy of W is to choose the ballet with probability
2/3 and choose the soccer game with probability 1/3.

2.2

Repeated Games

In many cases, games are played repeatedly rather than just one time. Repeated games
provide a formal framework to study why self-interested players manage to cooperate in a
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long term relationship. In such games, the same set of players repeatedly play the same
game, usually referred to as the “stage game”, for a finite or infinite number of times.
The progress of time in repeated games is measured in terms of time periods. The game
begins in period 0. Let st = (st1 , · · · , stn ) be the strategies that are played in period t. It is
assumed that the game begins with the null history h0 . For t ≥ 1, ht = (s0 , · · · , st−1 ) is the
vector of strategy profiles realized at all periods before t. H t = (A)t denotes the space of
all possible period t histories. All players observe history ht based on which each player can
condition his strategy in period t. Thus, a pure strategy si for player i in the repeated game
can be defined as a sequence of maps sti , one for each period t, that map possible period t
histories ht ∈ H t to strategies in Si . Similarly, a mixed strategy σi is a sequence of maps σit
from H t to the mixed strategy space Σi . Note that, the game starting at each play period
can be considered as a game in its own right, and is referred to as a subgame of the original
game.
The concept of a Nash equilibrium can be refined to describe an equilibrium of a repeated
game, known as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
Definition 2.6. A repeated game strategy s∗ is a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
if at each subgame, for all players i
s∗i ∈ arg max ui (si , s∗−i ).
si ∈Si

(2.5)

Also, if h∗ is the history generated by s∗ , then h∗ is the associated equilibrium path.
In other words, a SPNE is an equilibrium such that players’ strategies constitute a Nash
equilibrium in every subgame of the original game. In order to verify whether a strategy
profile of a repeated game (both finite and infinite horizon) with observed actions constitutes

25

a SPNE, it is sufficient to check if there exists any history ht where some player i can gain
by deviating from the strategy specified by si if ht occurs and conforming to si thereafter.
This is known as the one stage deviation principle.
Theorem 2.2. One Stage Deviation Principle: A strategy profile s is constitutes a
SPNE if and only if there is no player i and no strategy s0i that tallies with si except at a
single period t and ht and such that s0i is a better response to s−i than si , conditional on ht
being reached.
For games with a finite horizon, the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria can be determined by backward induction. However, for infinite horizon games, SPNEs cannot be
found using backward induction. Infinite horizon games are more appropriate for modeling
situations where players always believe the game can extend one more period with some
probability, while the finite horizon game more aptly models situations where the terminal
date is well foreseen.
Next, we consider a repeated game that involves bargaining between two players to share
a piece of pie and discuss its SPNE.

2.2.1

The Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining Model

In Rubinstein’s model two players must decide how to share a pie of size 1. In periods
0, 2, 4, · · · (i.e., in periods 2k, where k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) player 1 proposes a sharing rule (x, 1−x)
that player 2 can accept or reject. If player 2 accepts any offer the game ends. If player 2
rejects player 1’s offer in period 2k, then in period 2k + 1 player 2 can propose a sharing
rule (x, 1 − x) that player 1 can accept or reject. If player 1 accepts one of player 2’s offers,
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the game ends. Otherwise, if player 1 rejects players 2’s offer then the former player can
make an offer in the subsequent period and so on. This is clearly an infinite horizon game of
perfect information. Note that each period of the game comprises of two stages– in the first
stage, one of the players propose a sharing rule, while in the second stage the other player
announces his approval or refusal of the sharing rule.
The model specifies that, if (x, 1−x) is accepted in period t, then the payoff of the players
are (δ1t x, δ2t (1 − x)), where x is player 1’s share of the pie, and δ1 and δ2 are the discount
factor of the two players.
The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in this model is – “Player i always
demands a share of
than

δi (1−δj )
”.
1−δi δj

1−δj
1−δi δj

when making an offer and accepts any share equal to or greater

Note that player i’s demand of:
1 − δj
δj (1 − δi )
=1−
1 − δi δj
1 − δi δj

is the highest share for player i that is accepted by j. Player i cannot gain by making a
lower offer, for it too will be accepted. Making a higher (and rejected) offer and waiting to
accept his opponent’s offer next period hurts player i as:
µ
¶
1 − δi
1 − δj
1 − δj
δi 1 −
= δi2
<
1 − δi δj
1 − δi δj
1 − δi δj
Similarly, player i cannot gain by rejecting any offer of atleast
receives the share

1−δj
1−δi δj

next period, which is equivalent to

(2.6)

δi (1−δj )
,
1−δi δj

δi (1−δj )
1−δi δj

since if he rejects he

in the current period.

Rubinstein extended the work of Stahl who considered a finite horizon version of the
game. With a finite horizon game, the game can be easily solved by backward induction.
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The unique SPNE is the last period is for the player who makes the offer (say player 1)
to demand the whole pie, and for his opponent to accept this demand. In the second last
period, the last offerer (player 1) will refuse all offers that give him less than δ1 since he can
get δ1 · 1 by refusing and so on.

2.3

Mechanism Design

“The field of mechanism design aims to study how privately known preferences of many
people can be aggregated towards a “social choice”. The main motivation of this field
is microeconomic, and the tools are game-theoretic.”– Nisan and Ronen [55]. Mechanism
design aims to design games that have a dominant strategy solution such that the solution
leads to a desirable outcome.
In a distributed environment, such as the internet, participants cannot be assumed to
follow an algorithm or a protocol, but rather their own self-interest. Since computers on the
internet belong to different institutions or persons, they will likely act in a manner that is
beneficial to their owner and can potentially manipulate algorithms to this end. It is thus
important to design algorithms or protocols considering this kind of behavior in advance.
Studying algorithms from such a perspective is the focus of algorithmic mechanism design.
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2.3.1

Mechanism Design Problem

A mechanism design problem comprises of two components– a) the algorithmic output specification, and, b) descriptions of what the participating agents want, defined as utility functions over the set of possible outputs. Consider n agents. Each agent i ∈ {1, · · · , n} has
some private information which is referred to as his type ti ∈ Ti . An output specification
maps each type vector t = (t1 , · · · , tn ) to a set of allowed outputs. Depending on his private
information, each agent has his own preferences over the possible outputs. The preferences
of agent i are given by a valuation function vi that assigns a real number vi (ti , q) to each
possible output q.
A mechanism defines for each agent i a set of strategies Si . Each agent i chooses a strategy
si ∈ Si . The mechanism takes as input the vector of strategies s = (s1 , · · · , sn ). Based the
vector of announced strategies, s, the mechanism computes an output q(s) and a payment
pi (s) to each of the agents. The payment pi (s) is used to incentivize agent i to behave in
accordance with the mechanism’s overall goals. The utility of agent i is pi (s) + vi (ti , q(s)).
This is what each agent wants to optimize.
Mechanism Design Optimization Problem: This is a mechanism design problem
where the output specification is given by a positive real valued objective function g(q, t) and
a set of feasible outputs Q. The mechanism should be such that the output q ∈ Q optimizes
g.
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2.3.2

Properties of the Mechanism

A mechanism is said to solve a given problem if it can guarantee that the required output
occurs when each agent chooses his strategy in a selfish manner for maximizing his own
utility. A mechanism thus needs to ensure that the agents’ utilities are compatible with the
algorithm. The mechanism can influence the utilities of the agents by handing out payments.

2.3.2.1

Dominant Strategy Implementation

Let us denote the tuple (s1 , · · · , si−1 , si+1 . · · · , sn ) by s−i , and the tuple (s1 , · · · , sn ) by
(si , s−i ). A mechanism is said to be an implementation with dominant strategies if,
1. For each agent i and each ti ∈ Ti , there exists a strategy si ∈ Si such that for all
possible strategies of the other agents s−i , si maximizes agent i’s utility. Strategy si is
said to be a dominant strategy for agent i. In other words, for every possible strategy
ŝi ∈ Si and ŝi 6= si , we must have,
vi (ti , q(si , s−i )) + pi (si , s−i ) ≥ vi (ti , q(ŝi , s−i )) + pi (ŝi , s−i )

(2.7)

2. For every possible tuple of dominant strategies s = (s1 , · · · , sn ), the output q(s) satisfies the output specification.

A mechanism is said to be polynomial time computable if the output and payment
functions are computable in polynomial time.
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2.3.2.2

Truthful Implementation

In a lot of mechanism design problems, such as the shortest path problem and the task
scheduling problem, agents’ strategies simply involve reporting their types, i.e., Si = Ti . For
such problems, the following two properties should be exhibited by the mechanism.
• Incentive Compatibility: Each agent should be able to maximize his utility by
reporting his true type ti to the mechanism regardless of what other agents do so that
the mechanism is truthful or strategy-proof. In other words,
vi (ti , q(ti , t−i )) + pi (ti , t−i ) ≥ vi (ti , q(t̂i , t−i )) + pi (t̂i , t−i )

(2.8)

where, ti ∈ Ti is the true type of agent i and t̂i is any other type.
• Individual Rationality: The utility of an agent should be non-negative, so that it
is rational for him to participate in the game.

2.3.3

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms (VCG)

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism applies to maximization problems in mechanism design where the objective function is the sum of all agents’ valuations, i.e., g(q, t) =
P
i

vi (ti , q). The set of possible outputs is assumed to be finite. In general, we can define

the class of VCG based mechanisms as follows.
Definition 2.7. A direct revelation mechanism (p(t), q(t)) belongs to the VCG family if
P
1. q(t) ∈ arg maxQ ni=1 vi (ti , q(t))
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2. pi (t) =

P
j6=i

vj (tj , q(t)) + hi (t−i ), where hi () is some function of t−i

It has been proven in [29] that a VCG mechanism is truthful. In short, a VCG mechanism
provides a solution to maximization based mechanism design problems.

2.3.3.1

An Example– The Least Cost Path (LCP) Problem

Let us now provide an example of a mechanism design problem that can be solved using VCG
mechanism. Consider a communication network represented by a directed graph G = (E, V ).
For simplicity, assume that the graph is bi-connected. Each edge e in the graph is considered
as an agent who has private information regarding the cost of sending a packet along the
edge. The cost associated with each agent is considered as its type, te ≥ 0. The objective of
the problem is to find the cheapest path for sending a single packet from a given node s to
a given node d in the graph G. This is known as the Least Cost Path (LCP) problem.
In this problem, clearly, the set of feasible outputs are all paths from s to d. The objective
function is the path’s total cost. The valuation of an agent e is 0, if its edge is not included
on the chosen path, and −te , if its edge is included. The following mechanism ensures that
the dominant strategy for each agent is to truthfully report its type te to the mechanism.
1. Based on the reported cost of each agent, find the LCP from s to d. With the cost of
each agent used as its weight in G, the LCP simply corresponds to the shortest path
from s to d with respect to the weights of the agents.
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2. The payment pe given to an agent e is 0 if e is not in the LCP and pe = dG|e=∞ − dG|e=0
if it is. Here, dG|e=∞ is the cost of the least cost path that does not contain e, and
dG|e=0 is the cost of the least cost path when the cost of e is assumed to be zero.
It is easy to see that the shortest path indeed minimizes the total path cost. It can also
be verified that the above mentioned mechanism is a VCG mechanism. Here, dG|e=∞ corresponds to hi (t−i ) and dG|e=0 corresponds to

P
j6=i

vj (tj , q(t)).

What is the time complexity of finding all the payments? Since all agent (edge) weights
are non-negative, Dijkstra’s algorithm [19] can be used to find the shortest paths. Using
Dijkstra’s, a single shortest path can be found in O(|E| + |V |log|V |) time. Thus, finding all
payments would take O(|E|2 + |E||V |log|V |) time.

2.4

Auction Theory

An auction can be considered as a mechanism to allocate resources among a group of bidders.
Auctions are the one of the oldest surviving classes of economic institutions. The first
historical record of an auction is usually attributed to Herodotus, who reported a custom in
Babylonia where men bid for women to wed.
Auction theory seeks to study how people act in an auction market and explores designing auction formats for various market scenarios. There is substantial agreement among
economists that auctions are the best way to assign resources, such as spectrum [44]. Auc-
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tions seek an answer to the question “Who should get the item(s) for sell and at what
prices?”. Precisely, an auction can be said to accomplish the following tasks.

• Price discovery: In many cases, seller(s) (and even buyers) are not aware of how
much an item or service is worth and how much they should sell or buy it for. An
auction serves as a “market test” to ascertain the price tag that should be associated
with the item or service for sell.
• Winner determination: The auction process determines who the object (item, contract etc.) should be allocated to, or who “wins” the auction. An advantage of auction
is its tendency to assign the object to the bidder that values it most. This is important
in many situations, such as when the government auctions public assets like spectrum,
since the buyer that values the object most is usually the one that can use it best.
• Payment computation: The process can be used to determine how much the participants should pay.

2.4.1

Common Types of Auction

Traditionally there are four primary types of auction mechanisms that are used for the
allocation of a single item.
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• First price sealed-bid auction: In this auction, bidders submit their bids in sealed
envelopes to the auctioneer simultaneously. The envelopes are opened and the person
submitting the highest bid wins the object and pays the amount that he or she bid.
• Second price sealed-bid auctions: This is also known as the Vickrey auction. The
bidders submit their bids in sealed envelopes to the auctioneer simultaneously. The
envelopes are opened and the person submitting the highest bid wins the object but
pays an amount equal to the second highest bid.
• Open ascending-bid auction: This is also known as the English auction [24]. In
this auction, the price is steadily raised by the auctioneer, usually in small increments,
with bidders dropping out once the price becomes too high for them. The process
continues until only one bidder remains who wins the auction at the current price.
• Open descending-bid auction: This is also called the Dutch auction. The auctioneer begins by calling out a sufficiently high price that can presumably deter all bidders
from buying at that price. The price is progressively lowered until a bidder indicates
that he is prepared to buy at the current price. He or she wins the auction and pays
the price at which they bid.

Designing auctions involve designing games with dominant strategy solutions. We will
illustrate this using the example of Vickrey auction.
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2.4.2

An Example: The Vickrey Auction

A seller has one indivisible object for sale. There are n potential buyers (bidders). The
valuation of bidder i for the object is vi . The strategy of each player i is to submit his bid
si ∈ [0, ∞). Let us consider designing an auction to sell the object, i.e., determine which
bidder should get the object and what price he should pay.
A straightforward auction would be to award the painting to the highest bidder and
charge him his bid (first price sealed-bid auction). It is easy to see that this game does not
have a dominant strategy solution, i.e., a bidder may improve his utility by submitting a bid
si 6= vi . Vickrey’s second price auction, however, can be used to allocate the object so that
bidding one’s true valuation is a dominant strategy for each bidder. In this case, the highest
bidder would win the object and pay a price equal to the second highest bid. Precisely, if i
is the highest bidder, i.e., si > maxj6=i sj , his utility would be vi − maxj6=i sj , while the other
bidders would pay nothing and have an utility of 0.
Clearly, in this auction, for each player i, bidding his true valuation weakly dominates all
other strategies. To see why, let s∗i = maxj6=i sj . Now suppose first that si > vi . If s∗i ≥ si ,
then his utility would be 0, which is the same utility he gets by bidding vi . If s∗i ≤ vi , i
would obtain utility vi − s∗i regardless of bidding si or vi . If vi < s∗i < si , then i has an utility
of 0 by bidding vi which dominates his strategy of bidding si to get an utility of vi − s∗i < 0.
Now consider si < vi . In this case, for both s∗i ≤ si and s∗i ≥ vi , i’s utility would remain
unchanged regardless of bidding si or vi . However, if si < s∗i < vi , then i would have an
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utility of vi − s∗i by bidding vi which dominates his strategy of bidding si to get an utility of
0.
From the above discussion, clearly, no player can gain by not bidding his true valuation.
Moreover, notice that, since bidding one’s true valuation is a dominant strategy, it does not
matter whether a bidder knows the valuations of other bidders.

37

CHAPTER 3
RELATED RESEARCH
In this chapter, we review related research on spectrum allocation in DSA networks and on
provisioning incentives to stimulate cooperation among nodes in wireless ad-hoc networks to
route traffic.

3.1

Related Research on Spectrum Allocation

Coexistence of wireless systems that have to thrive by competing for spectrum has been
studied in [34, 54]. Such a competitive scenario typically corresponds to wireless service
providers competing for spectrum to maximize their revenue by supporting more customers.
In [54], the authors use game theory to analyze strategies of cognitive radio nodes for accessing channels. Their solution approach is based on regret minimization of the nodes and
propose an iterative learning algorithm using which nodes, that interact in a repeated game,
can determine the channels to use. In contrast, we model the competition for spectrum
among the nodes by considering the fact that each node will try to maximize its own benefit. Such modeling more aptly reflects non-cooperative interactions. Moreover, they assume
nodes in their model to be homogenous. However, we study a heterogenous environment and
allow nodes to compete for spectrum in a differential manner. In [34], the authors model the
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competition among network operators who compete for spectrum. However, their framework
is limited to a scenario where only two operators exist.
Spectrum sharing in wireless systems with an objective of maximizing overall system
utility has been studied in [9, 10, 13, 58, 59, 63, 76]. These works however do not study power
control. Techniques based on optimizing system utility primarily corresponds to collaborative
schemes among nodes usually deployed by the same wireless service provider. Buddhikot
et al. in [9, 10], propose a spectrum access architecture via a regional spectrum broker.
In [13], the authors propose a local bargaining approach for mobile ad-hoc networks where
users affected by mobility can form bargaining groups and adapt their spectrum assignment
to approximate a new optimal assignment, instead of recomputing spectrum assignments
for all users after each change in topology due to mobility. Their bargaining approach
takes as input a previous spectrum assignment, and performs computations to adapt to
recent topology changes. Nodes in their framework bargain to optimize a predefined system
utility in contrast to ours where nodes bargain to maximize individual benefits. The authors
in [58] formulate the problem of channel assignment, based on optimizing system utility,
as a variant of the graph coloring problem by mapping channels into colors, and assigning
them to users (nodes in the conflict graph of the network). They propose both a centralized
allocation scheme, where a central server calculates an allocation assignment based on global
knowledge, and a distributed approach, where devices negotiate local channel assignments
towards a global optimization. In [59], the authors propose using a spectrum server to
schedule the transmissions of a group of links sharing a common spectrum with an objective
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of optimizing network throughput. They assume that the spectrum server knows the link
gains in the network. Using a linear programming approach, the server then finds an optimal
schedule that maximizes the average sum rate subject to a minimum average rate constraint
for each link. To utilize the bandwidth left unused in cellular systems (considered as the
primary system), the authors in [63] propose the design of a secondary system in an overlay
mode over the primary system. The secondary system operates in a non intrusive manner
and does not interact with the primary cellular system. They design a Medium Access
Control protocol that enables inter-operation of the primary-secondary systems. The work
in [76] proposes a device-centric spectrum management scheme to maximize system utility
based on assigning orthogonal channels to interfering nodes. In their scheme, nodes observe
local interference patterns and act according to a set of predefined spectrum rules.
Spectrum sharing by making nodes transmit at different power levels for minimizing
interference has been studied in [18, 32, 33]. In [18], the authors consider power allocation
strategies for radios operating in unlicensed bands. They model radio interaction as a twoplayer reputation based repeated game and use genetic algorithms to explore the space of
possible power allocation strategies. The authors in [32] design auction mechanisms for
allocating power among a group of spread spectrum users who share the bandwidth with a
licensed user. In these auctions, the spectrum owner charges for SINR and received power.
The work in [33] considers a spectrum sharing problem in which each wireless transmitter can
select a single channel from a set of available channels, along with the transmission power.
In their scheme, users exchange price signals, that indicate the negative effect of interference
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at the receivers. Given this set of prices, each transmitter chooses a channel and power level
to maximize its net benefit.

3.2

Related Research on Incentive Based Routing

The problem of cooperation in wireless networks has been an area of active research in recent
years. Since forwarding a packet will incur a cost to a node, a selfish node will need incentive
in order to forward others’ packets. One possibility to provide incentive is to use a credit
based system for paying nodes that forward traffic.
Buttyan and Hubaux proposed the first credit-based system [11, 12] for wireless adhoc networks. In their scheme, they propose the usage of nuglets, a virtual currency, to
pay nodes to forward others’ packets. Such payments are deducted from the sender or the
destination. However, both proposals require a tamper-proof hardware at each node to
ensure correct payment. This requirement limits the applicability of their work. Motivated
by the nuglet, several other credit-based systems were proposed to stimulate cooperation
in packet forwarding. In [77], Zhong et al. proposed Sprite, a credit based system for
mobile ad-hoc networks, which provides incentives to selfish nodes for cooperating, without
requiring tamper-proof hardware at any node. Their scheme uses a central authority to
collect receipts from forwarding nodes based on which charges and rewards are made. They
devise a mechanism to make nodes honestly forward packets and report receipts. However,
they do not consider capacity constraint of the nodes in their framework. In [61], Salem et
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al. proposed a charging and rewarding scheme based on symmetric cryptography to make
collaboration rational for selfish nodes.
Nisan and Ronen first introduced the concept of algorithmic mechanism design in their
seminal work in [55]. In that work, they proposed using an incentive compatibility based
approach in conjunction with the more traditional protocol design approach. They also
applied the concept of mechanism design to the problem of finding the LCP from s to d
in a network with each edge (agent) having a cost of relaying a packet. With the cost of
each agent used as its weight in the underlying topology graph of the network, the LCP
corresponds to the shortest path from s to d with respect to the weight of the agents. To
induce each agent to truthfully report its cost they devise their pricing scheme according to
the VCG mechanism. In this scheme, the payment pe given to an agent e is 0 if e is not in
the LCP and pe = dG|e=∞ − dG|e=0 if it is. Here, dG|e=∞ is the cost of the least cost path
that does not contain e, and dG|e=0 is the cost of the least cost path when the cost of e is
assumed to be zero.
Several other works extended the model developed in [55], based on the VCG mechanism,
into different networking environments. For example, the authors in [25] tailored the LCP
based approach to work with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), considering Autonomous
Systems (ASs) as the agents. In [1], the authors propose Ad hoc-VCG, which is an adaptation
of the basic VCG algorithm to routing in mobile ad hoc networks. VCG has also been
extended to work with multicast routing in [72]. A VCG based payment mechanism has
also been used for LCP routing in ad-hoc networks in [71]. The work in [31] focusses on
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complexity issues of computing VCG payments. In [39], the authors formulated the LCP
problem in a multi-path routing scenario, but did not provide a solution to the problem.
The authors of [78] proposed Corsac, which integrates VCG and cryptographic techniques
to stimulate cooperation among wireless nodes.
As noted earlier, LCP need not be the path that minimizes the total payment that needs
to be made to agents for incentivizing them to report their true costs honestly. In fact, VCG
based mechanisms in general and LCP in specific suffer from the issue of high overpayment,
which was first pointed out by Archer and Tardos [2]. They investigate the “frugal path”
problem, which focusses on designing a mechanism that selects a path and induces truthful
cost revelation without paying a high premium. Their paper contributes negative results
on the frugal path problem and further proves that no reasonable mechanism can always
avoid paying a high premium to induce truthtelling. The work in [21] focuses on finding the
bounds for the price of truthful shortest path auction based routing mechanisms. In contrast
to studying bounds, we focus on explicitly minimizing the payment that needs to be given
to the nodes for routing traffic, while ensuring that no node has any incentive to dishonestly
report its cost and/or capacity to the routing mechanism.
The authors in [22] studied the minimization of the expected payment that needs to be
made to the relaying nodes to maintain truthfulness of their reported costs. But they did not
consider the capacity constraint of the nodes, thereby restricting their framework to be applicable only to the single path routing scenario. The authors in [64] extended their framework
by considering the capacity constraint of the nodes. However, to enforce the nodes to reveal
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their capacity truthfully, they rely on tamper-proof hardware or crytographic-receipt-based
software to be present in the nodes. This is counter intuitive since the very nodes that may
have an incentive to lie about their capacity has to install the special software/hardware
that will discourage them from lying.
The authors in [68] studies auctions in the context of multi-path routing, but restrict
their framework to the special case where the paths are node disjoint. Moreover, instead
of investigating strategy-proof solutions (i.e., dominant strategy solutions), they design a
mechanism in which there are Nash equilibria for all nodes to honestly bid their true cost.
In [70], the authors also relax the dominant strategy criteria of strategy proof solutions to
investigate Nash equilibria of honest cost revelation in the context of unicast routing in noncooperative wireless networks. In general, as noted by the authors in [68, 70], mechanisms
that result in Nash equilibria rather than dominant strategy solutions, require less payment
that VCG, however at the cost of degenerating strategyproofness. Also, notice that [68, 70]
only consider truthful revelation of the cost of a node disregarding capacity constraints. Wu
et al. in [74], studies incentive compatibility in the context of opportunistic routing [5, 14]
in wireless networks. In opportunistic routing, any node that overhears the transmission
of a packet can participate in forwarding the packet. These protocols uses link loss rates
to make forwarding decisions. The authors in [74] design a mechanism to prevent cheating
in reporting and measuring these loss rates. Feldman et al. in [26] investigates designing
contracts to induce cooperation when intermediate nodes can choose to forward or drop
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packets, as well as when the nodes can choose to forward packets with different levels of
quality of service.
The works we have discussed till now are credit based systems, in the sense that they
provide payment as an incentive to nodes for cooperating and forwarding traffic. Another
possibility to provide incentive is to use a reputation based system [7, 8, 40]. In general,
reputation based systems are usually modeled as a repeated game whose objective is to stimulate cooperation. In [40], Marti et al. proposed a reputation system for ad hoc networks,
in which a node monitors the transmission of a neighbor to observe whether the neighbor
forwards others’ traffic. If the neighbor does not forward others’ traffic, it is considered
as uncooperative, and this reputation is propagated throughout the network. The authors
in [7, 8] proposes and evaluates the CONFIDENT protocol, which detects and isolates misbehaving nodes. A drawback of reputation based systems is that many of them depend on the
broadcast nature of wireless networks in order to monitor other nodes. However, such monitoring may not always be accurate due to asymmetric links when nodes use power control.
Furthermore, use of directional antennas [65, 73] also increase difficulty in monitoring.
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CHAPTER 4
SPECTRUM BARGAINING IN COMPLETE
CONFLICT GRAPHS
In this chapter, we model the competition for spectrum among the nodes using non-cooperative
game theory. Specifically, we model the problem of agreeing upon a sharing rule of the channels among the nodes as a Rubinstein-Ståhl [60] [66] bargaining game. In our model, each
node “bargains” with the other nodes (opponents) in the network regarding its “share” (how
many and which) of the channels. In the finite horizon version of the game, nodes bargain
at most for a given number of periods. If the nodes can decide upon a sharing rule of the
channels within the given number of periods, each gets its respective share of the channels
as per the sharing rule. Otherwise, each node gets zero channels. In the infinite horizon
game, bargaining among the nodes go on until the nodes can agree upon a distribution of
the channels. Notice that, until the nodes agree upon the sharing rule, none of the nodes
can start data communication. Thus, “waiting” for the bargaining outcome also costs the
nodes. We consider this cost by discounting future payoff of the nodes. This discounting
represents the patience of the nodes in waiting for the bargaining outcome. We argue that it
is the relative patience of the nodes that influence the degree of fairness in the sharing rule.
As will become evident later, more patient nodes tend to get a larger fraction of available
channels.
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We solve the bargaining game depicted above by finding Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) strategies of the nodes. The SPNE strategies that we derive comprise a set of
strategies such that, no node in no subgame can deviate from its strategy and thereby gain
from the deviation. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves to a scenario where all secondary
nodes are within the interference range of each other. In other words, the conflict graph
of the secondary users is a complete graph. Such a scenario often occurs in urban areas
where the distribution of the secondary users is very dense. In Chapter 5 we will relax the
constraint of all nodes to be in the interference range of each other and extend our work
to arbitrary conflict graphs. Formally, the key points of this chapter can be considered as
follows.

• We model the problem of dynamic spectrum access, in which the nodes have to
agree upon a sharing rule of the channels among themselves, as an infinite horizon
Rubinstein-Ståhl [60, 66] bargaining game.
• We derive SPNE strategies of the nodes, such that, using their SPNE strategies each
node can optimize its utility against all its opponents in any subgame of the bargaining
game1 . In other words, considering nodes to be rational, each node can play its SPNE
strategy in the very first period of the game to decide on the sharing rule and start
data communication.
• We theoretically study how the discount factor of the nodes impact their relative utility.
1

Note that, the original game can also be considered a subgame of itself.
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• In our model, each node negotiates with its neighbors to agree upon the sharing rule,
without requiring any centralized controller. Our algorithm thus works in a distributed
manner making the system scalable.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the system model
considered and also illustrates our solution concept using an example. In Section 4.2, we
study the bargaining game considering only two nodes for ease of exposition. The N node
bargaining game and the proposed spectrum access algorithm is described in Section 4.3.
Finally, Section 4.4 concludes the chapter.

4.1
4.1.1

System Model and Solution Concept

System Model

We assume that N nodes (players) in a region are competing for a subset of M separate
orthogonal spectrum bands not used by primary incumbents. The nodes are indexed from 1
to N and the spectrum bands (channels) are indexed from 1 to M . The nodes, for example,
can correspond to IEEE 802.22 base stations accessing spectrum to connect their subscribers
units, cognitive radio based 802.11 network, etc. Each node is equipped with cognitive radio
and can communicate using multiple non-contiguous channels. The objective of each node is
to acquire the maximum possible number of channels that are orthogonal from its interferers.
We assume that each node can successfully detect the presence of primary users on a
channel and maintains a set of channels that it can use without affecting the operations of
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any primary user. Interference among the nodes has been modeled using the pair wise binary
matrix model [36]. This model basically states that– two nodes either conflict and has to
use orthogonal channels, or, they do not conflict and can reuse the same channel. We use
the following notations to represent the two system parameters.
• Interference constraint: Let I = {In,k |In,k ∈ {0, 1}}N ×N , be a N by N matrix,
representing the interference constraint among nodes,



 1 if node n and k conflict;
In,k =


 0 if node n and k do not conflict

(4.1)

Note that, I is the adjacency matrix representing the conflict graph of the network.
• Channel throughput: Let C = {Cm : 1 ≤ m ≤ M } be a M element array where Cm
represents channel m. Thus, C represents the set of available channels. We consider
a static interference environment without considering the impact of fast-scale channel
fading, since all the nodes are static. Further, we assume that all channels are homogeneous, i.e., all channels offer the same bandwidth and also have similar interference
characteristics.

4.1.2

Solution Concept– The Ultimatum Game

As mentioned earlier, we model the problem of spectrum sharing by a set of cognitive radio
enabled nodes as a bargaining game. Let us illustrate the concept of solving such a game,
i.e., finding its SPNE using an example. Specifically, let us consider a repeated version of the
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ultimatum game, in which two (hungry) players (P1 and P2 ) interact to decide how to divide
a sum of money (say $10) that is given to them (say for the purpose of buying food). The
players can meet at most 3 times in a day (finite horizon with T = 3 periods)– First in the
morning when P1 makes an offer to P2 regarding how to divide the sum. If P2 accepts the
offer then the two players buy breakfast using their respective share of the money. However,
if P2 rejects the share, both players stay hungry and meet in the afternoon when P2 makes
an offer to P1 . If P1 accepts the offer, the players have lunch using their money. Otherwise,
the players do not eat anything and meet in the evening when P1 makes a final offer to P2 . If
P2 accepts this offer, the players go for dinner. However, if P2 rejects P1 ’s offer, then neither
player gets any money and remains hungry for the night.
Notice that, if the players fail to agree upon a sharing rule in a bargaining period, they
have to stay hungry till the next period. Thus, the players discount their future payoffs. For
example, a player expecting to acquire $10 in the next period, can be satisfied with only $7
in the current period, considering a discount factor of 0.7. Also note that, the more hungry
a player is, lesser is his discount factor, since he would want to eat something as soon as
possible. In this example, we take δ1 = 0.6 and δ2 = 0.8. We also assume that the smallest
division of the goods available (money) is 1 cent. Let us reason backward from time t = 2
to find the SPNE of the 3-period game,
• Dinner: At time t = 2, the payoff maximizing equilibrium strategy for P1 is to offer
P2 the smallest amount possible that the latter will accept, which is 1 cent. P2 will
not reject this offer, since then he would get nothing.
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Table 4.1: Ultimatum Game: The SPNE strategy for the 3-period game is for P1 to demand
$6.79 and for P2 to accept any offer that gives him at least $3.21.
Period
0
1
2

P1 ’s share

P2 ’share

6.79
5.99
9.99

3.21
4.01
0.01

• Lunch: At time t = 1, the SPNE of the 2-period game is for P2 to offer P1 the
minimum amount more than which the latter cannot gain by rejecting the offer and
for P1 to accept this offer. Since at t = 2, P1 can acquire at most $9.99, which is worth
$9.99 × δ1 =$5.99 now, P2 should offer P1 $5.99 and keep the rest for himself.
• Breakfast: At time t = 0, the SPNE of the 3-period game is for P1 to offer P2 the
minimum amount more than which P2 cannot gain in any subgame by rejecting the
offer. Thus, P1 offers P2 $4.01 × δ2 = $3.21 and keeps the rest of $6.79 for himself.
Clearly, P2 cannot gain by rejecting this offer.
Table 4.1 shows the SPNE share of the two players in the various subgames. In each row,
the underlined player denotes the offerer in that period. Some observations,
• Discount factor: Notice that, instead of bargaining over breakfast, lunch and dinner,
had the players been bargaining to divide the money in 3 consecutive back-to-back
periods for breakfast, the players would become more patient while playing the game.
In other words, δ1 and δ2 will start tending to 1, as the time between two bargaining
periods tends to zero. It can be shown that as the discount factors tend to 1 and as
T → ∞ (infinite horizon) the players get an equal share [60].
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• First mover advantage: The finite horizon bargaining game we discussed has a first
mover advantage, since P1 does better than P2 . This first mover advantage disappears
as T increases and as we take the length of the time periods to be arbitrarily short.
This has been discussed in [4].

Conclusion: Before breakfast, if P1 offers P2 $3.21 and keeps the rest ($6.79) for himself,
then neither will P2 have an incentive to reject the offer nor will P1 have an incentive to
demand a larger share (and both players will be able to enjoy their breakfast). In this chapter
we seek to find the SPNE strategy of the players in the bargaining game of sharing spectrum
which will allow the player making the offer in the first period to propose a sharing rule such
that no player receiving the offer will have an incentive to reject their respective share and
neither will the player making the offer have an incentive to demand a larger share. Thus,
assuming players to be rational, all nodes will be able to acquire channels in the very first
period and can start communication.

4.2

2 Player Bargaining Game

We first study the channel allocation problem from a game theoretic perspective considering
only two nodes (players) for ease of exposition. We model the spectrum allocation problem as
an infinite horizon Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game. In our model two players must agree
on how to share the M available channels among them. The bargaining game proceeds in
“time periods” in which one player proposes a sharing rule to the other player who can
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either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the offer. The bargaining continues until a sharing rule is accepted
by both players. In periods 0, 2, 4, · · · (i.e., in periods 2k, where k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) player 1
proposes a sharing rule (x, M − x) that player 2 can accept or reject. If player 2 accepts any
offer the game ends. If player 2 rejects player 1’s offer in period 2k, then in period 2k + 1
player 2 can propose a sharing rule (x, M − x) that player 1 can accept or reject. If player
1 accepts one of player 2’s offers, the game ends. Otherwise, if player 1 rejects players 2’s
offer then the former player can make an offer in the subsequent period and so on. This is
clearly an infinite horizon game of perfect information.
Payoffs: We specify that if (x, M − x) is accepted in period t, then, the payoffs of players 1
and 2 are δ t x and δ t (M −x) respectively, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor of the players.
The discount factor δ represents the delay cost in achieving the bargaining outcome. Until
the players agree upon a sharing rule, none of the players can start communication. Thus, a
player values a channel more now than it values the same channel in a future period. This
decrease in value of the channels represents the dissatisfaction of the players in being unable
to start communication immediately. Note that, as the time delay between two bargaining
periods decreases, the players become more patient, i.e., δ increases.
Nash Equilibria: Note that there are a great many Nash equilibria (NE) in this game.
For example, the strategy profile “player 1 always demands x = M − 1 channels and refuses
all smaller shares; player 2 always offers x = M − 1 channels and accepts any offer giving
him atleast 1 channel” is a Nash equilibrium. In general, any partition of the M channels
between the two players corresponds to a NE strategy profile. However, not all of these
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profiles are subgame perfect. For example, in the aforementioned profile if player 2 rejects
player 1’s first offer, and offers player 1 a share x > (M − 1)δ in the next period, then player
1 should accept, because the best possible outcome for him if he rejects is to receive M − 1
channels in the next period, which is worth only (M − 1)δ.
We next investigate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game outlined above. First, we study the finite horizon version of the game and then extend the
results to obtain the perfect equilibrium for the infinite horizon version.

4.2.1

Finite Horizon Bargaining Game

The finite horizon bargaining game can be solved by backward induction. The unique
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the last period is for the player who makes the offer (let’s assume it is player 1) to demand M − 1 channels and for his opponent to accept
this demand2 . In the period before that, the offerer in the last period (player 1) will refuse
all offers that give him less than (M − 1)δ, because he can ensure this amount by refusing.
Thus, the perfect equilibrium in the second last period is for the offerer (player 2) to demand
M −(M −1)δ channels and for player 1 to accept this demand. This reasoning can be applied
backwards to obtain the unique SPNE in the first period.
Table 4.2 shows the SPNE of games (or subgames) with different number of periods.
Row i in the table shows the subgame perfect equilibria in the first period of a game with i
2

Note that, we assume for a player to accept an offer he has to be given atleast one channel. If a player is
offered 0 channels, he may not accept the offer deterministically even though such a sharing also corresponds
to a NE strategy profile.
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Table 4.2: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria.
Periods
1
2
3
4
·
·

Offerer

Receiver

M −1
M − Mδ + δ
M − M δ + M δ2 − δ2
M − M δ + M δ2 − M δ3 + δ3
·
·

1
Mδ − δ
M δ − M δ2 + δ2
M δ − M δ2 + M δ3 − δ3
·
·

periods. For example, row 3 shows the SPNE of a game with 3 periods. The SPNE in this
case is “Player i always demands a share of M − M δ + M δ 2 − δ 2 channels when it is his turn
to make an offer. He accepts any share equal to or greater than M δ − M δ 2 + δ 2 channels
and refuses any smaller share”.
It is evident from the table that the SPNE shares demanded by the two players in
increasingly larger period games form a pattern. Based on this pattern we find the SPNE
shares demanded by the two player in any arbitrary k period game. Depending on whether
k is even or odd, we have two cases:

• k is even: The SPNE share demanded by player i when it is his turn to make an offer
in a k period game is
2

3

{M − M δ + M δ − M δ + · · · − M δ

k−1

} + {δ

k−1

M (1 − δ k )
}=
+ δ k−1
1+δ

(4.2)

Also, player i accepts any share equal to or greater than
·

¸
M (1 − δ k )
M δ(1 + δ k−1 )
k−1
+δ
− δ k−1
M−
=
1+δ
1+δ
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(4.3)

• k is odd: The SPNE share demanded by player i when it is his turn to make an offer
in a k period game is
{M − M δ + M δ 2 − M δ 3 + · · · + M δ k−1 } − {δ k−1 } =

M (1 + δ k )
− δ k−1
1+δ

(4.4)

Also, player i accepts any share equal to or greater than
¸
M δ(1 − δ k−1 )
M (1 + δ k )
k−1
−δ
=
+ δ k−1
M−
1+δ
1+δ
·

(4.5)

Thus, the unique SPNE of a finite horizon bargaining game with k periods is– “Player
i always demands a share of

M {1−(−δ)k }
1+δ

− (−δ)k−1 channels when it is his turn to make an

offer. He accepts any share greater than or equal to

M δ{1−(−δ)k−1 }
1+δ

+ (−δ)k−1 and refuses any

smaller share.”

4.2.2

Infinite Horizon Bargaining Game

To obtain the SPNE of the infinite horizon game, we make k tends to infinity in the SPNE
of the finite horizon game with k periods. Thus, the SPNE share demanded by player i,
when it is his turn to make an offer in the infinite horizon game is
h
limk→∞

M {1−(−δ)k }
1+δ

k−1

i

− (−δ)

=

M
1+δ

(4.6)

Similarly, player i accepts any share equal to or greater than
h
limk→∞

M δ{1−(−δ)k−1 }
1+δ

k−1

+ (−δ)

i
=

Mδ
1+δ

(4.7)

Thus, the SPNE in this model is – “Player i always demands a share of
making an offer and accepts any share equal to or greater than
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Mδ
1+δ

M
1+δ

channels when

channels”. Note that

player i’s demand of:
M
Mδ
=M−
1+δ
1+δ
is the highest share for player i that is accepted by his opponent. Player i cannot gain by
making a lower offer, for it too will be accepted. Making a higher (and rejected) offer and
waiting to accept his opponent’s offer next period hurts player i as:
δ

Mδ
M
M
= δ2
<
1+δ
1+δ
1+δ

Similarly, player i cannot gain by rejecting any offer of atleast
he receives the share

M
1+δ

next period, which is equivalent to

(4.8)
Mδ
1+δ
Mδ
1+δ

channels since if he rejects
in the current period.

Note that in equations (4.6) and (4.7) as δ → 1, the players SPNE shares approaches
M/2. Based on this we make the following important observation.
The more patient players are, higher is the degree of fairness among them, i.e., the
channels tend to get equally divided between the players. In other words, lesser the time
delay between two consecutive bargaining periods, the channels get more and more equally
split between the players.
The SPNE share can be computed from their closed form from equations (4.6) and (4.7)
by the player making the offer in the very first period of the game. Thus the solution of the
bargaining game of apportioning the channels is computationally efficient.
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4.2.3

Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium

Let us now demonstrate that the subgame perfect equilibrium given in Section 4.2.2 is unique.
Continuation payoffs of a strategy profile in a subgame starting at period t is defined to be the
payoff in time t units of the outcome induced by that profile. For example, the continuation
payoff of player 1 at period 2 of a profile that leads to player 1 getting m channels in period
3 is mδ, whereas this outcome has a payoff of mδ 3 in period 0.
Let v1 and V1 be player 1’s lowest and highest continuation payoffs in any perfect equilibrium of any subgame that begins with player 1 making an offer. Similarly, let w1 and W1
be player 1’s lowest and highest perfect equilibrium payoffs in any subgame that begins with
an offer by player 2. Also, let v2 and V2 be player 2’s lowest and highest perfect equilibrium
continuation payoffs in any subgames beginning with an offer by player 2, and let w2 and
W2 be player 2’s lowest and highest perfect equilibrium continuation payoffs in any subgame
beginning with an offer by player 1.
When player 1 makes an offer, player 2 will accept any x such that player 2’s share of
M − x exceeds δV2 , since player 2 cannot expect more than V2 in the continuation game
following his refusal. Thus, we have,
v1 ≥ M − δV2

(4.9)

Similarly, player 1 will accept any share more than δV1 . Thus,
v2 ≥ M − δV1
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(4.10)

Now, player 2 will never offer a share greater than δV1 . Thus, player 1’s continued payoff
when player 2 makes an offer is
W1 ≤ δV1

(4.11)

Also, since player 1 can obtain at least v1 in the continuation game by rejecting player 2’s
offer, player 1 will reject any x (offered by player 2), such that x < δv1 . Thus, we have,
w1 ≥ δv1

(4.12)

Since player 2 can obtain at least v2 in the continuation game by rejecting player 1’s offer,
player 2 will reject any x (demanded by player 1), such that, M − x < δv2 . Hence, player
1’s maximum equilibrium payoff when making an offer V1 , satisfies,
V1 ≤ max(M − δv2 , δW1 )
Using inequality (4.11), we can say,
V1 ≤ max(M − δv2 , δ 2 V1 )

(4.13)

max(M − δv2 , δ 2 V1 ) = M − δv2

(4.14)

Next, we will prove that,

We prove this by contradiction. Let us assume that max(M − δv2 , δ 2 V1 ) = δ 2 V1 . Thus, we
have, V1 ≤ δ 2 V1 . For this to be true, it must be the case that, V1 ≤ 0 (since δ cannot exceed
1). However, this implies that, M −δv2 > δ 2 V1 , since δ ∈ [0, 1] and v2 ≤ M . This contradicts
our assumption. Thus, we can write,
V1 ≤ M − δv2
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(4.15)

Similarly, by symmetry,
V2 ≤ M − δv1

(4.16)

Now, combining inequalities (4.9) and (4.16), we can write,
v1 ≥ M − δV2 = M − δ(M − δv1 )
⇒ v1 ≥

M
1+δ

(4.17)

Also, combining inequalities (4.10) and (4.15), we can write,
V1 ≤ M − δv2 = M − δ(M − δV1 )
⇒ V1 ≤

M
1+δ

(4.18)

Thus, v1 ≤ V1 . This implies that v1 = V1 . Similarly, we can show that,
v2 = V2 =

M
1+δ

(4.19)

Now, since v1 = V1 , from inequality (4.11) and (4.12) we have, W1 ≤ δv1 and w1 ≥ δv1 . This
implies that,
w1 = W1 = δ

M
1+δ

(4.20)

w2 = W2 = δ

M
1+δ

(4.21)

Similarly, we can show that,

Thus, the perfect equilibrium continuation payoffs are unique. Now we will show that the
perfect equilibrium strategy profile is also unique. Let us consider a subgame that begins
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with an offer by player 1. We have already shown that player 1 must demand exactly x = v1 .
Note that player 2 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting this offer, since even if he
M
rejects the offer, he can acquire the same amount (δ 1+δ
) in the next period (but cannot

gain more than this). However, perfect equilibrium requires that player 2 accept player 1’s
demand of x = v1 with probability 1. If player 2 accepts all x < v1 with probability 1, but
accepts v1 with probability less that 1, then player 1 does not have any best response. Thus,
this randomization by player 2 does not lead to an equilibrium. A similar argument can be
applied to subgames that begins with an offer by player 2.

4.3

N Player Bargaining Game

We now investigate the game considering N players, i.e, N nodes, each within the interference
range of the others. In this game, N players must decide how to share the M available
channels among them. Let Pi (i ∈ [1, N ]) denote the player making the offer and let P−i =
{R1 , R2 , R3 , · · · , RN −1 } be the set of players receiving the offer. The subscripts of the players
in P−i follows the order in which they will make an offer next, if Pi ’s offer is rejected. In
periods kN (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ), player 1 (P1 ) proposes a sharing rule (x1 , x2 , · · · , xN ) that
players 2 through N (P−1 ) can accept or reject. If all players in P−1 accept their respective
offers, the game ends. However, if at least one player in P−1 rejects player 1’s offer in
period kN , then in period kN + 1 (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ), player 2 (P2 ) can propose a sharing rule
(x1 , x2 , x3 , · · · , xN ) that players in P−2 can accept or reject. And so on. In general player
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i ∈ [1, N ] makes an offer in periods kN + (i − 1). The game outlined above is clearly an
infinite horizon game of perfect information.
Next, we define the payoff of the players. If {xi |1 ≤ i ≤ N } is accepted in period t, then
the payoff of player i is δ t xi , where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor of the players. Like in the
two player case, δ represents the delay cost in achieving the bargaining outcome or in other
words reflects the patience of the players. Higher the patience of the players, larger is δ.

4.3.1

Subgame Perfection

As mentioned before, let Pi be the player making the offer and P−i = {R1 , R2 , R3 , · · · , RN −1 }
be the set of players receiving the offer. Recall that, the subscripts of the players in P−i
follows the order in which they will propose a sharing rule, if the offer proposed by Pi is
rejected. Following is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game– “Pi always demands a
share of
M
PN −1
n=0

δn

(4.22)

channels and offers player Rk ∈ P−i a share of
M
δ k PN −1
n=0

δn

channels. When player Rk ∈ P−i receives an offer, he accepts any share equal to or greater
than,
M
δ k PN −1
n=0
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δn

(4.23)

channels and rejects all smaller shares”. We will now prove that this is indeed a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game. Note that Pi ’s demand of,
"N −1
#
X
M
M
k
δ PN −1
PN −1 n = M −
n
n=0 δ
n=0 δ
k=1
is the highest share for player i that is accepted by his opponents. Player i cannot gain
by making a lower offer, for it too will be accepted. If player i makes a higher offer, then
at least one player in P−i (say Rk ) has to be offered a share lesser than δ k PNM
−1 n . Thus,
δ
n=0

Pi ’s offer will be rejected. After rejection, each of the following offerers in P−i , i.e., Rk for
k ∈ [1, N − 1], will offer player i a share of,
Ã
!
M
M
M
δ k δ N −k PN −1
= δ N PN −1
< PN −1
n
n
n
n=0 δ
n=0 δ
n=0 δ
Thus, Pi will end up with a smaller share by demanding a share greater than

M
PN −1
n=0

δn

channels.

Also, it is optimal for Rk ∈ P−i to accept any share greater than equal to δ k PNM
−1 n channels.
δ
n=0

This is because even if he rejects, Rk cannot gain more than this share in any subsequent
period3 .

4.3.2

Discussion

Note that, in equations (4.22) and (4.23), as δ → 1, the SPNE shares of the players approach
M/N . This corroborates with the observation we made in the two player case. Furthermore,
we assert that δ will be close to 1 in our model. This is because, the delay between two bargaining periods is almost negligible. If an offer is rejected, the next bargaining period begins
3

For example, if R1 rejects his share of δ PNM
−1 n in any period, in the next period R1 can demand at
δ

most

PNM
−1
n=0

n=0

δn

, which is worth only δ PNM
−1 n . And so on.
δ
n=0
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almost immediately. In general, as the delay between two bargaining periods become longer,
the players become more impatient (δ decreases). This is because following a rejection, they
will have to refrain from communicating over a longer period, until the next opportunity to
bargain.
It is also intuitive to think that an impatient player gets a lesser fraction of channels
against a more patient player. Since, in our game, all the players will be patient, nobody
can outlast the other(s) by waiting to get a larger share. Thus, in equilibrium, the players
will tend towards equally dividing the channels among themselves, as suggested by equations (4.22) and (4.23) when δ → 1.
Equations (4.22) and (4.23) give the closed form expression of the SPNE share of the
players. Thus, even in the N player case, solution of the bargaining problem can be found
efficiently without the need of any iterative process.
One might suspect that the bargaining game we discussed might have a “first mover
advantage”, i.e., a player making an offer earlier may have an advantage over a player who
gets to make an offer latter. This happens only in the finite horizon version of the game.
In the infinite horizon game, when we take the length of the time periods to be very short,
the “first mover advantage” disappears. This is shown in [4]. Since we model the spectrum
access problem as an infinite horizon bargaining game where the length of each bargaining
period will be very short (time taken to exchange messages or packets among nodes), our
solution does not suffer from the “first mover advantage” problem. Thus, ordering of the
players will not matter in our solution.
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4.3.3

Spectrum Allocation Algorithm

Notice that the SPNE strategy discussed in Section 4.3.1 may allocate “fractional” channels
to the nodes. However, since we consider each channel as an indivisible unit, such allocation
is not possible. Thus, to get the final solution, the SPNE shares of the players has to be
rounded to the nearest integer value. More precisely, the revised strategy of the players are–
“Pi always demands a share of round(M/
share of round(δ k M/

PN −1
n=0

PN −1
n=0

δ n ) channels and offers player Rk ∈ P−i a

δ n ) channels. When player Rk ∈ P−i receives an offer, he accepts

any share equal to or greater than round(δ k M/

PN −1
n=0

δ n ) channels and rejects all smaller

shares”. Based on this strategy of the players, Algorithm 1 presents the spectrum allocation
procedure that player Pi will invoke when making an offer. In the algorithm, L(Pi ) is the set
of channels that Pi should demand and L(Rk ) is the set of channels that should be offered
to Rk ∈ P−i .
Algorithm 1 Allocate Spectrum
Require: Number of players, N ; Set of available channels, C = {C1 , · · · , CM }; patience factor, δ
1: Channels Allocated, µ
A = {∅} ¶
channels from C − A}
2: L(Pi ) = {any round PNM
−1 n
n=0

δ

3: A = A ∪ L(Pi )
4: for k = 1 to N-1 do µ
¶
5:
L(Rk ) = {any round δ k PNM
channels from C − A}
−1 n
δ
6:
A = A ∪ L(Rk )
7: end for

n=0

4.4

Summary

This chapter models the problem of dynamic spectrum access by a network of N cognitive radio enabled nodes as a perfect information infinite horizon bargaining game. In the
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bargaining game, nodes “haggle” among themselves to agree upon a sharing rule of the
channels. The objective of each node is to acquire as many channels as possible from among
M orthogonal spectrum bands not in use by any primary incumbents, subject to the interference constraints. The nodes are associated with a discount factor which represents the
patience of the nodes in waiting for the bargaining outcome. We derive SPNE strategies of
the bargaining game, using which each node can optimize its utility against all its opponents
(interfering neighbors) in any subgame of the bargaining game. A closed form expression
of the SPNE share of the nodes has been derived, which makes finding of the bargaining
solution computationally efficient. Furthermore, the chapter also investigates the impact of
discount factor, δ, on fairness. Also, our approach is distributed in nature, obviating the
need of a centralized control.
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CHAPTER 5
SPECTRUM BARGAINING IN ARBITRARY
CONFLICT GRAPHS
In the previous chapter we assumed all secondary nodes to be within the interference range of
each other. This scenario mostly reflects the situation in urban areas. To expand the scope
of applicability of our bargaining framework, in this chapter we relax the assumption on
interference constraint taken in Chapter 4 and extend our work to arbitrary conflict graphs.
Similar to Chapter 4, we also model the competition for spectrum among nodes in an
arbitrary conflict graph as a Rubinstein-Ståhl [60] [66] bargaining game. In this game, each
node “bargains” with the other nodes (opponents) in the network regarding its “share” (how
many and which) of the channels. Each node is associated with a discount factor which
represents the patience of the nodes in waiting for the bargaining outcome. The patience of
the nodes, for example, can depend on the loss in revenue that a wireless service provider
suffers due to delay in being able to provide service.
We solve the bargaining game by deriving Subgame Perfect Nash Equilbrium (SPNE)
strategies of the nodes (players) in the game. Specifically, the contributions of this chapter
can be considered as follows. a) We model the problem of dynamic spectrum access, in
which the nodes in an arbitrary conflict graph have to agree upon a sharing rule of the
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channels among themselves, as a Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game. b) First, we investigate
finite horizon version of the game and identify its SPNE strategies using backward induction.
c) We then extend the results to the infinite horizon bargaining game. d) We identify Pareto
optimal equilibria of the game for improving spectrum utilization. e) We propose polynomial
time algorithms to find the SPNE strategies of both the finite and infinite horizon versions
of the game.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 formally defines the finite
horizon spectrum bargaining game. Section 5.2 derives SPNE strategies of the finite horizon
version of the game. These results are extended to the infinite horizon game in Section 5.3.
Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.

5.1

Finite Horizon Game Formulation

We first model the channel access problem as a finite horizon Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining
game. In this model, the game is played at most for a fixed number of periods. In Section 5.3
we will relax the finite horizon criteria and extend the concept to infinite horizon games.
The system model considered in this chapter is same as the one discussed in Section 4.1.1.
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5.1.1

Game Formulation

Given the conflict graph of a network, we now model the problem of channel access by the
nodes (players) as a finite horizon bargaining game. In this game, N players must decide
how to share the M available channels among them. The bargaining game proceeds in “time
periods” in which one player proposes a sharing rule to the other players. Each of the other
players can then either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the shares they have been respectively offered.
The bargaining continues until a sharing rule has been accepted by all players or until the
maximum number of allowable periods, T , has been reached (finite horizon game).
Let Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) denote the player making the offer in any arbitrary period and let
P−i = {Pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i} be the set of players receiving the offer. Pi makes an offer in
the following periods,



 kN + (i − 1) i ≤ T, k ∈ [0, b(T − i)/N c]


 None

(5.1)

i>T

Thus, the players make their offer in a round robin fashion. When making an offer in period
t, Pi ’s strategy is denoted by (xti , xt−i ), where xti ⊂ C is the set of channels demanded by Pi
in period t. Also, xt−i = {xtj ⊂ C|1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i} where xtj is the set of channels offered
to Pj ∈ P−i in period t. Also, each player Pj ∈ P−i chooses some function fjt : [0, |C|] →
{‘accept’,‘reject’} in period t, i.e, each Pj chooses which offers to accept and which to reject
depending on the number of channels he received, |xtj |.
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To illustrate the game, let us consider that N ≤ T 1 . In periods kN (for k ∈ [0, b(T −
kN
1)/N c]), player 1 (P1 ) proposes a sharing rule (xkN
1 , x−1 ) to all players (including himself).

After inspecting the offer, each player Pj ∈ P−1 can either accept or reject the respective
shares they have been offered. If all players in P−1 accept their respective shares, the game
ends. However, if at least one player in P−1 rejects the share he has been offered by P1 in
period kN , then in period kN + 1 (for k ∈ [0, b(T − 2)/N c]), player P2 can propose a sharing
+1
+1
rule (xkN
, xkN
) that players in P−2 can accept or reject. If all players in P−2 accept their
2
−2

respective shares, the game ends. And so on until an offer made by Pi is accepted by all
players in P−i or until the maximum number of allowable periods, T , has been reached. The
game outlined above is clearly a finite horizon game of perfect information.
Payoff: The outcome of the game can correspond to two different cases– all players agree
upon a sharing rule of the channels within T periods or they fail to do so within the allocated
time. Thus, to define the payoff of the players we need to study the following two cases.
• An agreeable sharing rule is obtained within T periods: If {xti |1 ≤ i ≤ N } is accepted
in period t, then the payoff of Pi is Ri = δit |xti |2 , where δi ∈ [0, 1] is the discount
factor of Pi . The discount factor represents the delay cost in achieving the bargaining
outcome. Until the players agree upon a sharing rule, none of the players can start
communication. Thus, a player values a channel more today than he values the same
channel in a future period. This decrease in value of the channels represents the
dissatisfaction of the players in being unable to start communication until the agreeable
1
2

Assuming N ≤ T is for illustrating the game now. Our analysis holds for all N and T
Note that δit is δi raised to the power of t.
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sharing rule is achieved. Also, note that, as the time delay between two bargaining
periods decreases, the players become more patient, i.e., the discount factor of the
players increases.
• An agreeable sharing rule is not obtained within T periods: This corresponds to the
disagreement outcome of the game. Clearly, if the players are unable to agree upon a
sharing rule, the payoff of each player would be zero.

5.1.2

Some Definitions

Let us define a few terms in game theory that has been used for the analysis of the bargaining
game in this chapter.

• Pareto Optimality: Pareto optimality is a measure of efficiency. An outcome of a
game is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as
well off and at least one player strictly better off. That is, a Pareto optimal outcome
cannot be improved upon without hurting at least one player.
• Backward Induction: Backward induction is an iterative process for solving finite
sequential games. First, one determines the optimal strategy of the player who makes
the last move of the game. Then, the optimal action of the next-to-last moving player is
determined taking the last player’s action as given. This process continues backwards
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in time until all players’ actions have been determined. Effectively, one determines the
Nash equilibrium of each subgame of the original game.

5.1.3

Equilibrium Analysis

t
We will represent the strategy profile in period t as {(xti , xt−i ), f−i
}, where (xti , xt−i ) is the the
t
sharing rule as proposed by Pi and f−i
= {fjt |1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i}, where fjt is the function

used by Pj ∈ P−i . If fjt (|xtj |) = ‘accept’ ∀j 6= i, then each player gets his respective share as
proposed in (xti , xt−i ). Otherwise all players get zero channels.
T −1
The strategy profile {(xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ), f−i
} is a Nash Equilibrium in period T − 1 (last

period) if fjT −1 (|xTj −1 |) = ‘accept’ ∀j 6= i and there is no set |yjT −1 | < |xTj −1 | such that
fjT −1 (|yjT −1 |) = ‘accept’ ∀j 6= i that leads to the existence of a set |yiT −1 | > |xTi −1 |. Here,
Pi does not have an incentive to unilaterally increase his demand, because that would be
rejected by some Pj ∈ P−i . Also, no Pj ∈ P−i would want to reject the share offered to him
by Pi , since then he would get zero channels.
However, note that all NE’s in the last period of the game need not be pareto optimal.
Our solution approach identifies and uses those NE’s that are pareto optimal to find the
SPNE strategy of the players in the first period of the game using backward induction.
In the next section we will first study SPNE of the finite horizon spectrum bargaining
game. We will then extend these results for the infinite horizon version of the game in
Section 5.3.
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5.2

Finite Horizon Bargaining Game

We will now investigate the SPNE of the finite horizon bargaining game (of T periods), where
each players bargains with the other players to agree upon a sharing rule of the channels.
Finding SPNE involves two main steps – (1) finding equilibrium of the last period of the
game and (2) finding equilibrium of the previous periods using backward induction.

5.2.1

Finding Last Period Equilibrium Strategies of the Players

According to the definition of NE in Section 5.1.3, following is a NE strategy for the players
in the last period of the game– “Pi offers a sharing rule (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ), such that |xTi −1 | is
maximized over all possible interference free allocations that assign at least 1 channel to all
players in P−i and the players in P−i accept all offers that give them at least 1 channel”.
This is a NE because, no Pj ∈ P−i will have an incentive to reject their respective shares,
since doing so will get them zero channels. Also, since Pi ’s share has been maximized, Pi
will not have an incentive to demand a larger share of channels.
Let us now see when Pi ’s share of channels gets maximized. Let us consider players in
P−i who are one hop away from Pi , i.e., neighbors of Pi in the conflict graph. Let they be
N br
N br
= {Pj |Pj ∈ P−i and Ii,j = 1}. Pi will obviously demand all
, where P−i
denoted by P−i

channels not allocated to any of his neighbors. Thus, we can write Pi ’s share of channels,
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xTi −1 , as,
[

|xTi −1 | = M − |

xTj −1 |

(5.2)

N br
Pj ∈P−i

T −1
Clearly, |xTi −1 | will get maximized when | ∪Pj ∈P−i
| has its minimum value over all
N br x
j
N br
possible interference free allocations given that each player in P−i
has to be given at least

one non-interfering channel. In other words, Pi ’s share of channels is maximized in all those
N br
sharing rules where the number of distinct channels allocated to the players in P−i
taken

together has the least value over all possible allocations.
N br
N br
Let P−i
= P−i \P−i
denote the players in P−i who are more than one hop away from

Pi . Since spectrum can be reused concurrently by players more than one hop away from
N br
do not directly influence xTi −1 . All
each other, the channel allocation of the players in P−i
N br
that is required for Pi is to offer the players in P−i
at least one non-interfering channel so

that his offer is accepted.
From the above discussion, it can be said that Pi ’s strategy, (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ), corresponds to
a NE when the following two conditions hold,

1. |

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

xTj −1 | is minimized over all possible interference free allocations, and,

2. Each player in P−i gets at least one non-interfering channel. This condition is to ensure
that the sharing rule offered by Pi is accepted, otherwise Pi ’s payoff will become zero.
Notice that there can be several NE strategy profiles, (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ), for Pi that maximizes
|xTi −1 |. However, not all of those will be Pareto optimal. It may be possible to improve the
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share of a player, xTj −1 ∈ xT−i−1 without hurting any xTk −1 , k ∈ [1, N ] and k 6= j. We need to
find those NE’s that are pareto efficient to maximize spectrum utilization.
Algorithm 2 Find Last Period SPNE
Require: Number of Players, N ; Interference Constraint, I; Set of Available Channels, C;
Number of Periods, T
1: i ← findLastOfferer(N ,T )
N br
N br
2: Sort the players in P−i
in non-increasing order according to their degree in g−i
.
N br
3: for all Pj ∈ P−i do
S
S
4:
xTj −1 = {Cm |Cm ∈
/ Ij,q =1 xTq −1 and Ck ∈ Ij,q =1 xTq −1 ∀k < m}
5: end for
S
6: xTi −1 ← {C\ Pj ∈P N br xTj −1 }
−i

N br
7: Sort the players in P−i
in non-increasing order according to their degree in g−i .
N br
8: for all Pj ∈ P−i
doS
S
T −1
9:
xj = {Cm |Cm ∈
/ Ij,q =1 xTq −1 and Ck ∈ Ij,q =1 xTq −1 ∀k < m}
10: end for
11: while true do
12:
assigned ← false
13:
for all Pj ∈ P−i do
S
S
14:
if ∃Cm : Cm ∈
/ Ij,q =1 xTq −1 and Ck ∈ Ij,q =1 xTq −1 ∀k < m then

S

15:
xTj −1 = {xTj −1 Cm }
16:
assigned ← true
17:
end if
18:
end for
19:
if !assigned then
20:
break
21:
end if
22: end while
23: return (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 )

Algorithm 2 finds the pareto efficient NE strategy (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ) of the player Pi making
the offer in the last period of the game. The algorithm does three primary tasks.
1. Find the last offerer: First we need to find the player, Pi , who will make the offer
in the last period. Algorithm 3 does this. It takes as input N and T and returns the
ID of the player making the last offer.
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Algorithm 3 findLastOfferer(N ,T )
Require: Number of players, N ; Number of Periods, T ≥ 1
1: if T ≤ N then
2:
i←T
3: else
4:
if T %N == 0 then
5:
i←N
6:
else
7:
i ← T %N
8:
end if
9: end if
10: return i
2. Find equilibrium strategy of Pi : In order to find pareto optimal NE strategy
T −1
(xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ) of Pi , where |xTi −1 | is maximized, our algorithm minimizes |∪Pj ∈P−i
|
N br x
j

such that each Pj ∈ P−i receives at least one channel and no xTj −1 ∈ xT−i−1 can be
improved without hurting any xTk −1 , k ∈ [1, N ] and k 6= j.
First we will describe how the algorithm finds a NE (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ) that need not be
pareto efficient. Minimizing |

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

xTj −1 | is equivalent to the problem of coloring

N br
the subgraph induced by the players in P−i
with the minimum number of colors.

We will use degree ordered graph coloring for this purpose. Let the subgraph of the
N br
N br
conflict graph induced by the players in P−i
be g−i
(need not be connected) and
N br
the subgraph induced by the players in P−i be g−i . g−i
is also a subgraph of g−i .
N br
has to be colored with the least possible number of colors.
To maximize |xTi −1 |, g−i

Note that this is different from coloring g−i , because a minimum color assignment of
N br
.
g−i does not necessarily minimize the color assignment of g−i
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N br
In line 2, the algorithm sorts the players in P−i
in non-increasing order based on
N br
N br
their degree in g−i
. In lines 3 to 5, the algorithm considers each player Pj ∈ P−i

in non-increasing order of their degree, and assigns Pj the first channel in C that
has not been assigned to any of Pj ’s neighbors. This process essentially intends to
minimize |

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

xTj −1 |. After the for loop in lines 3 to 5 ends, we can thus assign

Pi his maximizing share of M − |

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

xjT −1 | channels. This is done is line 6, which

assigns,
[

xTi −1 = {C\

xTj −1 }

(5.3)

N br
Pj ∈P−i

N br
Next, we are left with assigning a single channel to each player in P−i
to find Pi ’s NE

strategy (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ) that need not be pareto optimal. To do this, the algorithm first
N br
sorts the players in P−i
in non-increasing order according to their degree in g−i . Then
N br
in lines 8 to 10, each player Pj ∈ P−i
is considered in non-increasing order of their

degree and assigned a channel that has not been assigned to any of Pj ’s neighbors.
(xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ) obtained after the for loop in lines 8 to 10 ends is a NE strategy3 for
Pi even though it may not be pareto optimal. Since each Pj ∈ P−i receives only
one channel it may be possible to improve the share of some players in P−i without
decreasing the share of any other player. Notice that the share of Pi cannot possibly
be improved further since it has already been optimized.
|xTi −1 | has been maximized, and all players in P−i receives a channel each – so no Pj ∈ P−i has an
incentive to reject his share and also Pi does not have an incentive to demand more channels
3
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3. Find pareto optimal NE strategy of Pi : Improvement of Pi ’s NE strategy (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 )
obtained so far to get a pareto optimal NE strategy is called pareto improvement. This
pareto improvement is done by the while loop in lines 11 through 22. At each iteration
of the while loop, the algorithm checks each player Pj ∈ P−i to see if a channel can
be added to xTj −1 . The while loop iterates till no more channels can be assigned to
any player in P−i . Clearly, after the while loop terminates, (xTi −1 , xT−i−1 ) produced will
correspond to a pareto optimal NE strategy of Pi . Also note that the pareto improvements are done by trying to assign a single channel to a player Pj ∈ P−i at a time,
instead of assigning all C\{{

S
Ij,q =1

xTq −1 }

S

xTj −1 } channels to Pj at the same time.

This has been done to improve fairness.

5.2.2

Finding Equilibrium of the Previous Periods using Backward Induction

Let Pi be the offerer in period t and Pl (l 6= i) be the offerer in period t + 1. Given the
SPNE strategy of Pl in period t + 1, SPNE strategy of Pi in period t can be found based on
the following fact– if a player Pj ∈ P−i gets |xt+1
j | channels in period t + 1, then in period
t, Pj will accept any offer that gives him greater than equal to dδj |xt+1
j |e channels. This is
channels in period t + 1 is worth only δj |xt+1
because xt+1
j | in period t to Pj . Thus Pj can
j
be “satisfied” with only δj |xt+1
j | channels in period t. However, since a player cannot get
fractional channels, hence dδj |xt+1
j |e channels has to be offered to Pj in period t. Formally,
following is the SPNE strategy in period t.

78

N br
• SPNE strategy of Pi : For each Pj ∈ P−i
, Pi chooses a set of channels cj ⊂ xt+1
j
t+1
such that |cj | ≤ (|xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e) and for Cs ∈

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

xt+1
j \cj , ∀Cs ∈

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

possible so that xti = {xt+1
i

cj . Also, |

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

S
N br
Pj ∈P−i

cj it holds that Cs ∈
/

cj | should be the largest such set

S S
N br
{ Pj ∈P N br cj }} is maximized. Each Pj ∈ P−i
is offered
−i

t+1
the set of channels xtj = xt+1
j \cj . In other words, Pi offers at least dδj |xj |e channels
t+1
N br
N br
, taking at most |xt+1
to each Pj ∈ P−i
j | − dδj |xj |e channels from each Pj ∈ P−i

such that xti is maximized over all possible interference free allocations that allows Pi
t+1
N br
to take at most |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e from each Pj ∈ P−i .

• SPNE strategy of Pj ∈ P−i : Each Pj ∈ P−i accepts all offers in which they get at
least dδj |xt+1
j |e channels.
Clearly, no player will have an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his strategy. If Pi
N br
makes a larger demand of channels than xti defined above, then some Pj ∈ P−i
has to

be given a smaller share of channels than dδj xt+1
j e in period t, and thus Pi ’s offer will be
rejected. If rejected, in no subsequent period can Pi hope to get a share of channels which
in period t is worth more than |xti |4 . Also, no player Pj ∈ P−i in period t can hope to get a
share of channels in any subsequent period which in period t is worth more than dδj |xt+1
j |e.
Thus, the above mentioned strategy of the players comprises a SPNE in period t. In other
words, no player can deviate from his above mentioned strategy in period t and subsequently
gain from his deviation in any sub-game starting from period t.
Recall that if a player Pj , j ∈ [1, N ] gets the set of channels xt+2
in period t + 2, then in period t it is
j
worth only δj2 |xt+2
|
to
P
.
j
j
4
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Algorithm 4 Find SPNE by backward induction
Require: Number of Players, N ; Interference Constraint, I; Set of Available Channels, C; Number of
Periods, T
1: (xTl −1 , xT−l−1 ) ← Find Last Period SPNE(N ,I,C,T )
2: for t = T − 2 to 0 do
3:
if l = 1 then
4:
i←N
5:
else
6:
i←l−1
7:
end if
N br
8:
Pb−i
← {φ}
N br
9:
for all Pj ∈ P−i
do
t+1
10:
s ← |xj | − dδj |xt+1
j |e
11:
if s > 0 then
t+1
12:
Qj ← Ps (xt+1
j )\Ps−1 (xj )
S
N br
N br
13:
← Pb−i
Pj
Pb−i
14:
end if
15:
end for
N br
16:
if Pb−i
is null then
t
17:
xi ← xt+1
i
18:
xtj ← xt+1
j , ∀Pj ∈ P−i
19:
l←i
20:
continue
21:
else
QN
N br
22:
Q ← j=1 Qj : Pj ∈ Pb−i
23:
end if
24:
for r = 1 to r = |Q| do
25:
index S
←1
26:
S ← { Pj ∈P N br \PbN br xt+1
j }
−i
−i
27:
for all j = 1 to j = N : Pj ∈ PbN br do
28:
29:

t+1
s ← |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e

−i

crj ←index+s−1
qr {Elements index to index + s − 1 of set qr }
index
S
r}
S ← S {xt+1
\c
j
j
index ← index + s

30:
31:
32:
end for
33:
profit(qr ) ← {qr \S}
34:
end for
35:
Select qm ∈ Q : |profit(qm )| = maxqr ∈Q;1≤r≤|Q| (|profit(qr )|)
S
36:
xti ← xt+1
profit(qm )
i
t+1
t
N br
37:
xj ← xj \profit(qm ), ∀Pj ∈ Pb−i
t+1
t
N
br
38:
xj ← xj , ∀Pj ∈ P−i \Pb−i
39:
while true do
40:
assigned ← false
41:
for all Pj ∈ P−i do S
S
42:
if ∃Cm ∈ C : Cm ∈
/ Ij,q =1 xq and Ck ∈ Ij,q =1 xq ∀k < m then
S
43:
xtj = {xtj Cm }
44:
assigned ← true
45:
end if
46:
end for
47:
if !assigned then
48:
break
49:
end if
80
50:
end while
51:
l←i
52: end for
53: return (x01 , x0−1 )

Algorithm 4 finds the SPNE strategy of the offerer Pi , i ∈ [1, N ] in period t given the
equilibrium strategy of the offerer Pl , l ∈ [1, N ], l 6= i in period t + 1 to finally find the
SPNE strategy (x01 , x0−1 ) of P1 in the first period of the game. The algorithm first invokes
algorithm 2 to find the equilibrium strategy, (xTl −1 , xT−l−1 ), of offerer Pl in period T − 1 (last
period) and works in iterations of decreasing period number, using backward induction to
find the SPNE strategy of the offerer in the respective period at each iteration. The algorithm
finally outputs the SPNE strategy (x01 , x0−1 ) of offerer P1 in the first period of the game. As
discussed earlier, this is such a strategy that no Pj ∈ P−1 can gain in any sub-game by
rejecting his respective share in x0−1 . Also P1 ’s share, x01 , is maximized so that P1 does not
have an incentive to demand a larger share of channels.
Let us now delve into the details of algorithm 4. We will explain how the algorithm finds
the equilibrium strategy (xti , xt−i ) of offerer Pi in period t given the equilibrium strategy
t+1
(xt+1
l , x−l ) of offerer Pl (l 6= i) in period t + 1. Algorithm 4 does the following tasks:

1. Find offerer Pi in period t: First the algorithm finds the offerer Pi in period t. This
is done in lines 3 to 7.
2. Find SPNE strategy of Pi in period t: Pi ’s SPNE strategy in period t will correspond to Pi taking the maximum possible number of channels from his neighbors in
order to maximize his share of channels in period t. In order to maximize the number
N br
, Pi will have to consider all
of channels that Pi can acquire from his neighbors in P−i
t+1
interference free allocations that allow him to take at most |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e channels
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N br
from Pj ∈ P−i
and use the one that allows Pi to take the maximum number of chan-

nels from his neighbors. Steps 8 to 38 basically does this. Let us look at these steps
in more detail.
N br
Note that, Pi can potentially take channels only from those Pj ∈ P−i
for whom
t+1
N br
bN br ⊂ P−i
|xt+1
be the set of neighbors of Pi satisfying
j | − dδj |xj |e > 0. Let P−i
N br
and also generates the
this criteria. The for loop in lines 9 to 15 finds the set Pb−i
N br
set Qj for each Pj ∈ Pb−i
where Qj is the set of all subsets of xt+1
with cardinality
j
t+1
bN br is null. In this case Pi
|xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e. Note that, it is possible that the set P−i

cannot take channels from any of his neighbors. Thus, the SPNE strategy for Pi will
be to demand the set of channels, xti = xt+1
i , and offer each Pj ∈ P−i the set of channels
bN br
xtj = xt+1
j . The case of P−i being null is taken care of in lines 16 to 20 at the end of
which the algorithm continues onto the next iteration to find the strategy of the offerer
in period t − 1.
N br
For the case when Pb−i
is not null, we define set Q as the cartesian product of all
N br
Qj for Pj ∈ Pb−i
. Thus, element qr ∈ Q, r ∈ [1, |Q|], is a set of channels that
t+1
N br
Pi can acquire from his neighbors in Pb−i
taken together, taking |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e
N br
channels from neighbor Pj ∈ Pb−i
. Set Q has all such combination of channels that
N br
. Notice that in line 22, the cartesian product
Pi can take from his neighbors in Pb−i
N br
considers the Qj ’s in ascending order of their subscripts.
of all Qj for Pj ∈ Pb−i

According to our definition of Q and rules of cartesian product, if Pj is the lowest
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t+1
N br 5
numbered player in Pb−i
, then the first |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e channels of qr ∈ Q belong
N br
N br
to Pj ∈ Pb−i
. Likewise, if Pk is the second lowest numbered player in Pb−i
then the
t+1
r
bN br
next |xt+1
k | − dδk |xk |e channels belong to Pk ∈ P−i . And so on. Let cj ⊂ qr be the
N br
set of channels belonging to Pj ∈ Pb−i
. Notice that Pi can use a channel Ck ∈ qr ,

iff Ck ∈
/ {

S

t+1 r
\cj }}
N br {xj
Pj ∈Pb−i

S S
{ Pj ∈P N br \PbN br xt+1
j }. In other words, Pi can use a
−i

−i

N br
channel Ck ∈ qr if and only if no Pj ∈ Pb−i
has Ck after the set of channels crj has
N br b N br
been taken from Pj and neither does any Pj ∈ P−i
\P−i have the channel Ck . Let

profit(qr ) ⊂ qr be the set of channels that Pi can use from among the channels in qr .
Thus,
profit(qr ) = qr \{{

[

r
{xt+1
j \cj }}

N br
Pj ∈Pb−i

[ [
{ xt+1
j }}

(5.4)

N br \P
bN br
Pj ∈P−i
−i

N br
where, crj ⊂ qr is the set of channels belonging to Pj ∈ Pb−i
. The for loop in lines 24 to

34 finds the set profit(qr ) ⊂ qr for qr ∈ Q, ∀r ∈ [1, |Q|]. Trying to maximize the number
of channels Pi can acquire from his neighbors, Pi will choose set qm ∈ Q, m ∈ [1, |Q|]
such that,
|profit(qm )| = maxqr ∈Q;1≤r≤|Q| (|profit(qr )|)

(5.5)

and take the set of channels profit(qm ) from his neighbors. Thus, in period t, Pi ’s share
of channels will be (line 36),
xti ← xt+1
i

[

5

profit(qm )

(5.6)

Let Q1 = {{C1 , C2 }, {C3 , C4 }} and Q2 = {{C3 , C5 }, {C6 , C7 }}.
Then Q = Q1 × Q2 =
{{C1 , C2 , C3 , C5 }, {C1 , C2 , C6 , C7 }, {C3 , C4 , C3 , C5 }, {C3 , C4 , C6 , C7 }}. For any q ∈ Q, the first two elements
of q belong to Q1 and the next two elements belong to Q2 . Also we define Q to be Q1 × Q2 and not Q2 × Q1
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N br
Also, clearly in period t, each Pj ∈ Pb−i
will be left with the set of channels {xt+1
j \profit(qm )}.
N br
Since each Pj ∈ Pb−i
will have at least dδj |xjt+1 |e channels6 in period t, no Pj will have

an incentive to reject his share of (line 37),
xtj ← xt+1
j \profit(qm ),

N br
∀Pj ∈ Pb−i

(5.7)

N br 7
All other players, i.e., Pj ∈ P−i \Pb−i
, can have the same share of channels in period

t as they had in period t + 1, and thus no Pj will not have an incentive to reject their
share of (line 38),
bN br
xtj ← xt+1
j ; ∀Pj ∈ P−i \P−i

(5.8)

The strategy (xti , xt−i ) obtained for Pi is a SPNE strategy for Pi in period t. Clearly, no
Pj ∈ P−i can gain in any sub-game (play after period t) by rejecting their respective
shares in xt−i . Also, Pi cannot make a “successful” demand of a larger share of channels
than xti , since the number of channels that Pi can take from his neighbors has been
optimized over all possible interference free allocations that allows Pi to take at most
t+1
N br
t
t
|xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e channels from Pj ∈ P−i . However, (xi , x−i ) strategy for Pi obtained

so far may not be pareto optimal. It may be possible to improve the share of some
players in P−i without decreasing the share of any player. We deal with this next.
3. Find pareto optimal SPNE strategy of Pi : Pareto improvement of Pi ’s SPNE
strategy, (xti , xt−i ), obtained so far to obtain a pareto optimal strategy for Pi is done
t+1
bN br
bN br will have
qr ∈ Q has been computed taking |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e from Pj ∈ P−i . Thus, each Pj ∈ P−i
t+1
at least dδj |xj |e channels in the share offered to them in period t.
7
N br b N br
Note that this includes neighbors of Pi from whom Pi could not take any channels (P−i
\P−i ), as well
N br
as players who are more than a hop away from Pi (P−i )
6
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by the while loop in steps 39 through 50. At each iteration of the while loop, the
algorithm checks each player Pj ∈ P−i to see if a channel can be added to xtj . The
while loop iterates till no more channels can be assigned to any player in P−i . Clearly,
after the while loop terminates, (xti , xt−i ) produced will correspond to a pareto optimal
SPNE strategy for Pi in period t.
When algorithm (4) terminates, it finds a SPNE strategy, (x01 , x0−1 ), for P1 in the first period,
such that P1 cannot make a larger demand of channels than x01 that will be accepted by all
players in P−1 . If rejected, P1 cannot hope to get a share of channels in any subsequent period
which in period 0 is worth more than |x01 |. Also, no player in P−1 can hope to get a share of
channels in any subsequent period which in period 0 is worth more than his respective share
in x0−1 . Thus, the players in P−1 does not have an incentive to reject their share in x0−1 .

5.2.2.1

A more efficient implementation

Though algorithm 4 lays down the basic idea of finding SPNE strategies of the spectrum
bargaining game using backward induction, it checks all combinations of channels that allow
t+1
bN br
an offerer Pi in period t to take |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e channels from neighbor Pj ∈ P−i . To

do away with checking all such combinations, algorithm 5 presents a more computationally
efficient procedure for finding the SPNE strategy of offerer Pi in period t (that need not be
Pareto optimal).
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Algorithm 5 Find SPNE strategy of offerer Pi in period t
1: S ← {φ}
2: for all Cm ∈ C : Cm ∈
/ ∪Pj ∈P N br \PbN br xt+1
do
j
−i
−i
P
3:
s ← Pj ∈PbN br |Cm ∩ xt+1
j |
−i
4:
if s > 0 then
s
5:
S ← S ∪ Cm
6:
end if
7: end for
8: Sort the channels in S in non-decreasing order according to their superscripts in S.
N br
b−i
9: Mark all Pj ∈ P
as available.
t+1
t+1
bN br
10: rj ← |xj | − dδj |xj |e ∀Pj ∈ P
−i
11: xtj ← {xt+1
}
∀j
∈
[1,
N
]
j
12: for all Cm ∈ S do
N br
13:
if all Pj ∈ Pb−i
for which |xtj ∩ Cm | = 1 is marked available then
N br
14:
rj ← rj − 1 ∀Pj ∈ Pb−i
: |xtj ∩ Cm | = 1
N br
15:
xtj ← xtj \Cm ∀Pj ∈ Pb−i
: |xtj ∩ Cm | = 1
t
t
16:
xi ← xi ∪ C m
N br
17:
Mark all Pj ∈ Pb−i
as unavailable for which rj = 0.
18:
end if
19: end for
The critical task is to find the maximum set of channels that offerer Pi can acquire
N br
in period t. Recall that, Pi can potentially take channels only from those Pj ∈ P−i
for
t+1
bN br
whom |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e > 0 (denoted as P−i ). Keeping this in mind, algorithm 5 finds

the maximum set of channels that Pi can take from this neighbors. The basic idea of the
N br
algorithm is to sort the channels that the players in Pb−i
has (in period t + 1) in ascending

order based on the number of players that possess each channel. The algorithm then considers
t+1
taking each channel in this ascending order, ensuring that no more than |xt+1
j | − dδj |xj |e
N br
.
channels is taken from each Pj ∈ Pb−i

Notice that the strategy (xti , xt−i ) found by algorithm 5 for offerer Pi in period t need not
yield a Pareto optimal equilibrium. It may be possible to improve the share of some players
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in P−i without decreasing the share of any player. The Pareto optimal SPNE strategy of Pi
can be found by a while loop similar to the one in lines 39 to 50 of algorithm 4.
It can be easily verified that the worst case complexity of finding the SPNE strategy of
offerer Pi in period t is O(M 2 D), where D is the highest degree of a node in the conflict
graph.

5.2.3

An Illustrative Example

Figure 5.1 shows an example of how to find the SPNE strategy (x01 , x0−1 ) of P1 in the first
period of the game. We consider a network of 6 nodes. The graphs in Figure 5.1 depict the
conflict graph of the network. The number of channels available, M , has been assumed to be
5. Each node has a discount factor of 0.5. The game is played for 6 periods. The channels
assigned to the nodes in each period has been shown in brackets beside the node.
Figure 5.1(a) shows the pareto optimal NE strategy of P6 in the last period of the game
as obtained by using algorithm 2. The offerer in this period is P6 . First, a NE strategy
of P6 in the last period (which need not be pareto optimal) is found using lines 2 to 10 of
the algorithm. In lines 2 to 6, P6 colors his neighbors (P2 and P3 ) with the least possible
number of colors (channels) and keeps rest of the channels for himself (thereby maximizing
N br
his share). In lines 7 to 10, the players in (P−6
) (i.e, P1 , P4 and P5 ) are given a channel each

by graph coloring them. This is done by considering P1 , P4 and P5 in non-increasing order of

87

(2,3,4,5)

(1)

6

3

2

5

(1)

(3,5)

(2,3,4,5)

6

1

4

(2,4)

(1,3,5)

6

3

2

5

(1)

(2,3,5)

(a) Period 5; Offerer P6

(2,3,4,5)

(1)

(3,4,5)

(1,2)

3

6

3

5

(1)

(2,3,5)

1

4

(4)

(1,2,3,5)

2

5

(1,2)

(3,5)

(c) Period 3; Offerer P4

(1,2)

(3,5)

(2)

6

3

6

3

5

(1,2,4)

(3,5)

(4)

(1,2,3,5)

1

4

(4)

(1,2,3,5)

(d) Period 2; Offerer P3

(3,5)

2

4

(b) Period 4; Offerer P5

(1)

2

1

1

4

(4)

(1,2,3,5)

(e) Period 1; Offerer P2

2

5

(1,2,4)

(5)

1

4

(1,4,3)

(2,5)

(f) Period 0; Offerer P1

Figure 5.1: Pareto optimal SPNE of the respective offerer in different periods.
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their degree in the subgraph induced by P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 and P5 . Thus, P1 is considered first8
and gets C2 , next P5 gets C3 and finally P4 gets channel C1 . Clearly, the channel assignment
obtained so far corresponds to a NE strategy of P1 in the last period, but one that may not
be pareto optimal, since the shares of some players (P1 , P4 and P5 ) can be improved without
hurting the share of any other player.
The pareto optimal NE strategy of P6 is obtained using lines 11 to 22 of algorithm 2.
This is done by considering the players in P−6 and checking to see if more channels can be
assigned to the player. In the first iteration of the while loop, P1 receives C4 , P2 and P3 does
not get any more channels, P4 gets C3 and P5 gets C5 . In the second iteration of the while
loop only P4 gets C5 . The channel assignment obtained now is shown in Figure 5.1(a), and
corresponds to the pareto optimal NE strategy of P6 in the last period of the game.
We will exemplify the concept of finding the SPNE strategy of an offerer Pi in period t
from the SPNE strategy of offerer Pl (l 6= i) in period t + 1 (refer algorithm (5)) by showing
how to find the SPNE strategy of the offerer P3 in period 2 from the SPNE strategy of P4
N br
in period 3. Note that P−3
= {P1 , P5 , P6 }. The four channels that P6 has in period 3 is

equivalent to having d4 × 0.5e = 2 channels in period 2. Thus, P3 can potentially take 2
channels from P6 . Similarly, the 3 channels that P5 has in period 3 is equivalent to having
d3×0.5e = 2 channels in period 2. Thus, P3 can potentially take 1 channel from P5 . However,
P3 will not be able to take any channel from P1 , since the latter has only one channel in the
previous period. In fact, this also implies that P3 will not be able to take channel 4 (due to
8

If two nodes have the same degree then the lower numbered node is considered first
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N br
interference constraints). Thus Pb−3
= {P6 , P5 }. Now, algorithm (5) will sort the channels
N br
that P3 can potentially take from this neighbors in Pb−3
in ascending order based on the
N br
number of players in Pb−3
that possess each channel (line 8 algorithm (5)). This yields the

set S = {C2 , C3 , C5 }. First, C2 is considered. Since the channel is possessed by both players
P5 and P6 and a channel can be taken from both the players, P3 takes channel C2 from P5
and P6 . Next, channel C3 is considered, which is also possessed by both players P5 and P6 .
However, since no more channels can now be taken from P5 , P3 cannot take C3 . Similarly,
C5 cannot be taken also. Thus, P3 only takes C2 from both P5 and P6 , making x23 = {1, 2}.
It can be easily seen that the maximum number of channels that P3 can acquire from his
neighbors is indeed 1.
The channel assignment obtained so far is a SPNE strategy for P3 in period 2. However,
it may not be pareto optimal. To obtain the pareto optimal SPNE strategy of P3 , a while
loop of the form discussed earlier can be used which would assign C2 to P2 . The channel
assignment obtained subsequently would correspond to the pareto optimal SPNE strategy
of P3 in period 2 of the game. This is shown in Figure 5.1(d).
Following the same line of reasoning, we finally obtain the SPNE strategy (x01 , x0−1 ) of P1
in the first period of the game. This strategy of P1 is shown in Figure 5.1(f).
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5.3

Infinite Horizon Bargaining Game

Until now we have studied the bargaining game for accessing channels as a finite horizon
game of T periods. In this game, if the players can agree upon a sharing rule within T
periods then each player gets his respective share of channels. However, if the players fail to
agree on a sharing rule within T periods, then the outcome of the game corresponds to the
disagreement outcome, and all player gets zero channels. We have studied SPNE strategies
in this game and and have also presented an algorithm to find the SPNE strategy of the
player (P1 ) making the offer in the first period.
However, it is more realistic to consider that players will go on bargaining until all
players can agree on a sharing rule of the channels. Such a bargaining game is called an
infinite horizon bargaining game. To study the infinite horizon game, we will first extend the
definition of the finite horizon game defined in Section 5.1. Specifically, in the infinite horizon
game, each Pi for i ∈ [1, N ] makes an offer in periods kN + (i − 1) where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }.
We will denote the SPNE strategy of P1 in the first period of a T period finite horizon game
as (x01 , x0−1 )T . Also, let (x01 , x0−1 )Tj denote set x0j in (x01 , x0−1 )T for j ∈ [1, N ]9 .
Our solution of the infinite horizon game is based on the following fact– for the finite
horizon game, there exists a T such that the number of channels each player receives in the
SPNE strategy of P1 , (x01 , x0−1 )T , of a T period game, is equal to the number of channels each
0

player receives in the SPNE strategy of P1 , (x01 , x0−1 )T , in a T 0 period game, for all T 0 > T .
9

Recall that (x01 , x0−1 ) = (x01 , {x02 , x03 , · · · , x0N })
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Figure 5.2: Pareto optimal SPNE strategy (x01 , x0−1 )T of a 6 player finite horizon game of
varying number of periods, T . Here M = 8 and δi = 0.7, ∀i ∈ [1, 6]
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0

In other words, ∃T such that for all T 0 > T we have |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj | = |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj |, ∀j ∈ [1, N ].
We will show this via simulation. Figure 5.2 shows the SPNE strategy (x01 , x0−1 )T of a 6
player finite horizon game with varying number of periods, T . The conflict graph has been
randomly generated. The number of channels available, M , has been taken to be 8 and
the discount factor of all players is 0.7. As can be clearly seen from the figure, for T > 6,
|(x01 , x0−1 )Tj | = |(x01 , x0−1 )6j |, ∀j ∈ [1, N ]. Thus, to find the SPNE strategy, (x01 , x0−1 )∞ , of the
infinite horizon game, we simply need to find the SPNE strategy, (x01 , x0−1 )T , of a finite horizon
0

game of T periods, such that for all T 0 > T we have |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj | = |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj |, ∀j ∈ [1, N ].
Based on this, algorithm 6, gives the procedure that P1 will invoke to find his SPNE strategy,
(x01 , x0−1 )∞ , in the infinite horizon game.
Algorithm 6 Find Infinite Horizon SPNE
Require: Number of players, N ; Interference Constraint, I; Set of Available Channels, C;
Number of Periods, T ;
1: (x01 , x0−1 )Tj −1 ← {φ}, ∀j ∈ [1, N ]
2: while true do
3:
(x01 , x0−1 )T ← Find SPNE by B.I(N ,I,C,T )
4:
if |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj | = |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj −1 |, ∀j ∈ [1, N ] then
5:
break
6:
else
T ←T +1
7:
8:
end if
9: end while
10: return (x01 , x0−1 )T
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5.3.1

Discussion

• Value of T , the starting period: Algorithm 6 finds the SPNE of P1 in the first
period, starting from a T period game, until it finds a T 0 period game, such that,
0

|(x01 , x0−1 )Tj | = |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj

0 −1

|, ∀j ∈ [1, N ]. The algorithm then outputs the SPNE of P1
0

in the infinite horizon game as (x01 , x0−1 )T . The period T 0 at which the SPNE strategy
of P1 converges depends on several factors– the number of players, N ; the number of
available channels, M ; and the average discount factor of the players, δ. More precisely,
we have,
T0 ∝

N
M · (1 − δ)

(5.9)

Thus, T 0 – (i) increases as the number of player increases, (ii) decreases as more channels
become available and (iii) increases as the discount factor of the players increases,
i.e., as the players become more patient in waiting for the bargaining outcome. To
minimize the number of iterations required by algorithm 6 to find T 0 , T should be
made proportional to

N
.
M ·(1−δ)

• First (last) Mover Advantage: One might suspect that the bargaining game we
discussed suffers from the “first (last) mover advantage” problem, i.e., a player making
an offer earlier (later) may have an advantage over a player who gets to make an offer
later (earlier). This happens only in the finite horizon version of the game. In the
infinite horizon game, when we take the length of the time periods to be very short,
the “first (last) mover advantage” disappears [4]. Since we model the spectrum access
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problem as an infinite horizon bargaining game where the length of each bargaining
period will be very short (in the order of time taken to exchange messages or packets
among nodes), our solution does not suffer from the “first (last) mover advantage”
problem. Thus, ordering of the players will also not matter in our solution.
• Building the conflict graph: In our solution, we consider that each player knows the
interference constraint, I, i.e., is aware of the conflict graph of the network. Players
can know the conflict graph of the network over time by periodically sharing their
perceived conflict graph with their interferers (neighbors) using control channel. Let
us assume time is divided into slots. Initially, at time t = 0, the players only know of
themselves. At t = 1, the players exchange their conflict graph with their neighbors to
know their 1-hop away interferers. At t = 2, the players again exchange their conflict
graph with their neighbors to know of nodes that are 2-hop away. And so on. For a
conflict graph of N vertices, following this procedure, a player can know the conflict
graph of the network in at most N − 1 time steps.

5.4

Summary

This chapter models the problem of dynamic spectrum access by a set of cognitive radio
enabled nodes as an infinite horizon bargaining game where the nodes bargain among themselves to agree upon a sharing rule of the channels. First, the chapter explores the finite
horizon version of the bargaining game and presents polynomial time algorithms to find the
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Pareto optimal SPNE strategy of the player making the offer in the first period of the game.
This is a strategy, such that, neither can the player making the offer increase his utility by
making any other offer, nor can the players receiving the offer gain in any subsequent period
by rejecting this offer. Next, we extend the results from the finite horizon game to find the
Pareto optimal SPNE strategies of the infinite horizon game. Using their SPNE strategies,
no player gets starved of channels. Finally, since in the bargaining model nodes negotiate
among themselves, no centralized controller is needed.
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CHAPTER 6
INCENTIVE BASED ROUTING
The channels that a secondary node acquires come to it at a price. Thus, to forward traffic,
each secondary node would incur a cost because of using the spectrum it has acquired by
making a payment. Moreover, using the acquired spectrum, each node can sustain a certain
capacity. Clearly, secondary nodes will not have an incentive to relay traffic unless they are
compensated for the costs they incur in forwarding traffic. Also, for a routing mechanism to
be stable, the amount of traffic that a node forwards should not exceed its capacity.
In this chapter, we adopt the approach of Bayesian based algorithmic mechanism design
for designing an optimal routing mechanism that minimizes the payment to be made to the
nodes while theoretically ensuring that no node has any incentive to dishonestly declare its
cost and/or capacity. Our routing mechanism is comprised of two components– a) route
selection function, which determines the route(s) that requires the least expected payment.
We refer to such a route as the the Expected Least Paid Route (ELPR), and, b) pricing
function, which determines the payment to be made to each node. The focus of this chapter
is to design these two functions. Formally, the key contributions of this chapter can be
considered as follows.
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• Optimal Routing Mechanism Design: We propose a path auction based routing
mechanism in which nodes announce their cost and capacity, based on which a multi-path
route is chosen and payments are made to the nodes. The route selection mechanism
and the payment function ensure that all nodes can maximize their profit by truthfully
reporting their cost and capacity, while the payment that needs to be made to the nodes
is minimized.
• Polynomial Time Implementation: In addition to theoretically deriving the functions
that determine the route selection and the payments to be made, we provide polynomial
time algorithms for deploying the routing mechanism in DSA networks.
• Modeling Uncertainty in DSA Networks: We model cost of a node and its capacity
as random variables. This serves a two-fold purpose– a) it helps tame the uncertainty
regarding the actual cost and capacity of a node; and, b) it helps reflect the heterogenous
nature of the nodes in a DSA network in terms of both space and time variation of the
cost and capacity of nodes.

The remainder of the chapter in organized as follows. Section 6.1 defines the system
model and also formally presents the path auction problem. Section 6.2 develops the theory
of optimal path auction design. For simplicity and clarity of exposition, first Section 6.3
considers how to deploy such a path auction mechanism in the case of single-path routing,
by assuming that each node in the network has sufficient capacity to route the sender’s
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traffic. Next, Section 6.4 discusses algorithms to deploy the path auction mechanism in the
multi-path routing scenario. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.

6.1
6.1.1

Network Model and Problem Formulation

Network Model

We consider a DSA network whose topology is depicted by the graph G = (V, E). Here V
is the set of secondary nodes and E is the set of links between the secondary nodes. Each
node j ∈ V has the following two private information, that comprises its type.

• Capacity cj : Each node j acquires a certain amount of spectrum which can sustain
a capacity cj , measured in packets per unit time.
• Cost mj : Each node j pays a cost mj per unit time, for the time it uses the spectrum,
to the primary owner.

Thus, the type of node j ∈ V is defined by the 2-tuple,
tj = {mj , cj }

(6.1)

We refer to the parameters of cost and capacity of a node as the dimensions of its type. It is
worth emphasizing that, even though we consider a packet to be the smallest granularity of
data transfer, our analysis would also hold true even if we consider other granularities such
as bits.
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Consider a traffic flow that originates from source node s and terminates at destination
node d. Let N represent the set of candidate secondary nodes available for routing the flow.
Thus,
N = V \{s, d}

(6.2)

We label the nodes in N from 1 to n, i.e., N = {1 · · · n}. Before the flow begins, each node
j ∈ N reports its type to the routing mechanism as the 2-tuple,
t̂j = {m̂j , ĉj }

(6.3)

A truthful mechanism has to guarantee that no node j ∈ N has any incentive to lie about
its type, i.e., no node can earn an extra profit by falsely reporting its type. In other words,
the mechanism has to ensure that the reported type t̂j = tj , ∀j ∈ N (m̂j = mj and ĉj = cj ).

6.1.2

Bayesian based Modeling and Assumptions

The routing mechanism, however, is not aware of the true type of an intermediate node
j ∈ N willing to route the sender’s traffic. To this end, we will tackle the problem using
the conventional economics approach of Bayesian mechanism design, modeling mj and cj as
random variables. We assume that the uncertainty about the type of node j ∈ N can be
described by two continuous probability density functions (p.d.f)– one for the cost, mj and
another for the capacity, cj – each defined over some finite interval and that the functions are
known to the mechanism.
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• p.d.f of mj : We let aj and bj represent the lowest and highest possible cost respectively
that node j might incur per unit time for transmitting packets over its spectrum. We
let fjM : [aj , bj ] → R+ be the p.d.f for j 0 s cost mj and assume that: −∞ < aj < bj < ∞;
fjM (mj ) > 0, ∀mj ∈ [aj , bj ]; and fjM (.) is a continuous function on [aj , bj ].
• p.d.f of cj : We let vj and wj represent the lowest and highest possible capacity
respectively that node j can sustain. We let fjC : [vj , wj ] → R+ be the p.d.f for j 0 s
capacity cj and assume that: −∞ < vj < wj < ∞; fjC (cj ) > 0, ∀cj ∈ [vj , wj ]; and
fjC (.) is a continuous function on [vj , wj ].
The two density functions and their corresponding domains can be constructed in practise
based on historical reports of the cost mj and the capacity cj . Now, cost, mj , as well as the
capacity, cj , depend on the supply demand dynamics of spectrum availability in the vicinity
of node j. Thus, we consider mj and cj to be dependent random variables. Let fjM C be their
continuous joint probability density function defined over the domain, Tj . Thus,
Tj = [aj , bj ] × [vj , wj ]

(6.4)

Let T denote the set of all possible combinations of types of the nodes in N . Thus,
T = T1 × · · · × Tn

(6.5)

Now, if tj = {mj , cj } is the type of j, then the price that j pays to the primary spectrum
owner for transmitting a packet over its spectrum is mj /cj . We denote this price associated
with the type of j as tpj . Let fjP be the probability density function of the continuous random
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variable tpj over the domain,
·

Tjp

aj bj
=
,
wj vj

¸
(6.6)

Let T p denote the set of all possible combinations of the per packet prices that can be
associated with the types of the nodes in N . Thus,
T p = T1p × · · · × Tnp

(6.7)

p
Also, for node j ∈ N , let T−j
denote the set of all possible combinations of the per packet

prices that can be associated with the types of the nodes in N other than j, so that
p
T−j
= ×i∈N Tip

(6.8)

i6=j

We assume that the types of the nodes in N are stochastically independent from each other.
Thus, the joint density function on T p for the vector tp = (tp1 , · · · , tpn ) of individual per packet
prices associated with the vector t = (t1 , · · · , tn ) of individual types is,
f P (tp ) =

Y

fjP (tpj ) =

j∈N

Y

fjP (mj /cj )

(6.9)

j∈N

Also, we assume that a node j ∈ N assesses the uncertainty about the types of the
other nodes in N in the same way as the routing mechanism does. Consequently, both
p
the mechanism and node j assess the joint density function on T−j
for the vector tp−j =

(tp1 , · · · , tpj−1 , tpj+1 , · · · , tpn ) associated with the vector t−j = (t1 , · · · , tj−1 , tj+1 , · · · , tn ) of individual types of all nodes in N except j as,
P
(tp−j ) =
f−j

Y
i∈N
i6=j
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fiP (tpi )

(6.10)

6.1.3

Problem Formulation

The optimal routing mechanism design problem is to devise a path auction mechanism
such that the expected payment made by the end-user to the nodes in N to have its traffic
routed from s to d is minimized, while enforcing nodes to reveal their type to the mechanism
truthfully. The end-user can correspond to either s or d. We consider the direct revelation
mechanism class, where the nodes in N simultaneously and confidentially announce their
respective type tj = {mj , cj }, j ∈ N , to the routing mechanism. The mechanism then
determines on which path(s) to route the traffic from s to d and how much each node in
N should be paid, as some functions of the vector of per packet prices tp = (tp1 , · · · , tpn )
associated with the vector of announced types t = (t1 , · · · , tn ). Next, we formally define
these functions.

6.1.3.1

The outcome functions– p(·) and q(·)

Let P s→d denote the set of all paths from s to d, with each path consisting of nodes defined in
G, and let K = |P s→d | with the paths in P s→d labeled from 1 to K. The routing mechanism
can then be described by a pair of outcome functions (p, q) such that, pj (tp ) (j ∈ [1, n]) is
the amount of money paid to node j for each packet delivered to d by the nodes in N (or,
routes in P s→d ) and qi (tp ), (i ∈ [1, K]), is the fraction of traffic routed over path i. The
function q(·) is thus the route selection function and p(·) is the pricing function. Two points
to be observed are,

103

• In our definitions we allow for the possibility that a node might receive payment without
routing any traffic, though later we will show that this will never be the case.
• We allow multiple path routing.

6.1.3.2

Expected Utility functions

We consider expected utility of the end-user in terms of the price that the end-user needs
to pay for each packet from s that is routed by the underlying network and delivered to d.
In Section (6.4.3) we will discuss who actually makes the payments. The expected utility of
the end-user from the routing mechanism described by (p, q) is,
Ã

Z
Ue (p, q) =
Tp

X

!
p

pj (t ) f P (tp )dtp .

(6.11)

j∈N

m

where, dtp = dtp1 · · · dtpn and dtpj = d( cjj ), j ∈ [1, n]. Similarly, we consider the expected
utility of node j ∈ N in terms of its profit per packet delivered to d by the routes in P s→d .
If the type of j is tj = {mj , cj }, then its expected utility from the auction mechanism is,


Z
X

 P p
p
p
Uj (p, q, tpj ) =
qi (tp ) f−j
(t−j )dtp−j
(6.12)
pj (t ) − tj
p
T−j

j

i∈P s→d

j

where, P s→d is the subset of paths in P s→d that pass via node j.
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6.1.3.3

The Optimization problem

The objective of the path auction design problem is to shape the pair of outcome functions
(p, q), such that, the expected utility of the end-user as defined by equation (6.11) is minimized. However, there are certain constraints that must be imposed on (p, q) to be able to
describe a feasible auction mechanism. We describe these constraints below.
1. Individual Rationality Constraint: No node in N can be forced to participate in the
auction if its utility from routing traffic is negative. If a node does not participate in the
auction, then clearly its utility would be zero. Thus, to ensure that all nodes in N participate
in the auction, the following individual rationality constraint must hold.
Uj (p, q, tpj ) ≥ 0,

∀j ∈ N, ∀tpj ∈ Tjp

(6.13)

2. Incentive Compatibility Constraint: The type announced by a node j ∈ N to the
mechanism is always susceptible to have been dishonestly reported if j expected to gain
from lying. Thus, to make the nodes in N reveal their respective type truthfully, no node
should be able to expect an extra profit from lying about its type. In other words, honestly
revealing its own type should form a dominant strategy for every node in N in the auction
game. If node j ∈ N reports its type as t̂j = {m̂j , ĉj } while its true type is tj = {mj , cj },
then its expected utility is given by,


Z
X

 P p
pj (t̂pj , tp−j ) − tpj
qi (t̂pj , tp−j ) f−j
(t−j )dtp−j

p
T−j

j

i∈P s→d
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(6.14)

where, (t̂pj , tp−j ) = (tp1 , · · · , tpj−1 , t̂pj , tpj+1 , · · · , tpn ) Thus, to ensure that no node in N has an
incentive to lie about its type, the following incentive compatibility condition must hold,


Z
X

 P p
Uj (p, q, tpj ) ≥
pj (t̂pj , tp−j ) − tpj
qi (t̂pj , tp−j ) f−j
(t−j )dtp−j ,

p
T−j

j

i∈P s→d

∀j ∈ N, ∀tpj ∈ Tjp , ∀t̂pj ∈ Tjp (6.15)
Notice that if t̂pj = tpj , i.e.,

m̂j
cˆj

=

mj
,
cj

then the expected utility of j by reporting type t̂j is

equal to Uj (p, q, tpj ). So node j cannot expect to gain by falsely reporting a type t̂j if t̂pj = tpj .
3. Traffic Allocation Constraint: Clearly, sum of the fraction of traffic allocated over all
paths is 1. Thus,
K
X

qi (tp ) = 1 and qi (tp ) ≥ 0,

∀i ∈ [1, K], ∀tp ∈ T p

(6.16)

i=1

4. Node Capacity Constraint: The total traffic rate that a node routes cannot exceed
its capacity. Thus, the following constraint must hold on the aggregate traffic rate that
traversers a node,
R

X

qi (tp ) ≤ cj ,

∀j ∈ N, ∀tp ∈ T p

(6.17)

j
i∈P s→d

where, R is the rate at which s injects its traffic into the network.

6.2

Optimal Path Auction Design

Let Qj (q, tpj ) denote the expected fraction of traffic that node j ∈ N will be made responsible
for forwarding due to a path auction mechanism (p, q), given that j’s type is tj = {mj , cj }.
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Thus, we can define,


Z
Qj (q, tpj ) =

p
T−j



 X
 P p
qi (tp ) f−j
(t−j )dtp−j


(6.18)

j

i∈P s→d

Based on the above definition, we first present a simplified incentive compatibility constraint.
Lemma 6.1. The incentive compatibility constraint presented in (6.15) holds if the following
two conditions holds for ∀j ∈ N, ∀mj , nj ∈ [aj , bj ], ∀cj , dj ∈ [vj , wj ].
1. if mj ≤ nj and cj ≤ dj , then,
¡ nj ¢
¡ mj ¢
Qj q,
≤ Qj q,
cj
dj

2.

¡

mj ¢
Uj p, q,
=
cj

bZ
j /vj

mj /cj

¡
bj ¢
Qj (q, ψj )dψj + Uj p, q,
vj

(6.19)

(6.20)

Proof. To simplify the incentive compatibility constraint we need to consider all the ways in
which a node can lie about its type. A node can do so by increasing or decreasing the value
of one or both the dimensions of its type. Thus, we need to consider four cases– a node can
either (i) exaggerate its cost but understate its capacity, or, (ii) exaggerate its capacity but
understate its cost, or, (iii) exaggerate both its cost and capacity, or, (iv) understate both
its cost and capacity.
Case (i) and (ii): The value of one of the dimensions is exaggerated while the other one is
understated.
Let us first assume that mj is the true cost and dj is the true capacity of j (tj = {mj , dj }),
while the node dishonestly announces nj and cj as its cost and capacity respectively (t̂j =

107

{nj , cj }). The expected utility of j because of adopting this strategy is,


Z
 ¡ nj p ¢ mj X ¡ nj p ¢ P p
, t−j −
qi
, t−j  f−j (t−j )dtp−j
pj
cj
dj
cj
j
p
T−j

Z
=
p
T−j

Z
p
T−j

i∈P s→d





 ¡ nj p ¢ nj X ¡ nj p ¢ P p
, t−j −
qi
, t−j  f−j (t−j )dtp−j +
pj
cj
cj
cj
j


i∈P s→d


¶ X
¡ nj p ¢ P p
mj
 nj
−
qi
, t−j  f−j (t−j )dtp−j

cj
dj
cj
j
µ

¡

nj ¢
=Uj p, q,
+
cj

µ

i∈P s→d

nj
mj
−
cj
dj

¶

¡ nj ¢
Qj q,
cj

(6.21)

The incentive compatibility constraint (6.15) states that, for any node in N , the expected
utility obtained by reporting its true type must be greater than or equal to the expected
utility obtained by lying about its type. Thus, we have,
µ
¶
¡
¡
¡ nj ¢
nj
mj ¢
nj ¢
mj
Uj p, q,
≥ Uj p, q,
+
−
Qj q,
(6.22)
dj
cj
cj
dj
cj
Similarly, considering nj as the true cost and cj as the true capacity of j (tj = {nj , cj }),
while the node reports mj and dj as its cost and capacity respectively (t̂j = {mj , dj }), we
get,
µ
¶
¡
¡
¡ mj ¢
mj
nj ¢
mj ¢
nj
Uj p, q,
≥ Uj p, q,
+
−
(6.23)
Qj q,
cj
dj
dj
cj
dj
From inequalities (6.22) and (6.23), we have,
µ
µ
¶
¶
¡ nj ¢
¡
¡
¡ mj ¢
nj
mj
mj ¢
nj ¢
nj
mj
−
≤ Uj p, q,
− Uj p, q,
≤
−
Qj q,
Qj q,
cj
dj
cj
dj
cj
cj
dj
dj
Since, we know

nj
cj

>

mj
,
dj

(6.24)

condition (1) of lemma (6.1) follows.

Case (iii) and (iv): The value of both the dimensions is either exaggerated or understated.
Next, let us consider that mj is the true cost and cj is the true capacity of j (tj = {mj , cj }),
while the node announces nj and dj as its cost and capacity respectively (t̂j = {nj , dj }). The
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expected utility of j because of adopting this strategy is,


Z
 ¡ n j p ¢ m j X ¡ n j p ¢ P p
,t
−
qi
, t−j  f−j (t−j )dtp−j
pj
dj −j
cj
d
j
j
p
T−j

¡
nj ¢
+
=Uj p, q,
dj

µ

i∈P s→d

nj
mj
−
dj
cj

¶

¡ nj ¢
Qj q,
dj

(6.25)

Because of incentive compatibility constraint (6.15), we have,
µ
¶
¡
¡
¡ nj ¢
mj ¢
nj ¢
nj
mj
Uj p, q,
≥ Uj p, q,
+
−
Qj q,
cj
dj
dj
cj
dj

(6.26)

Again, considering nj as the true cost and dj as the true capacity of j (tj = {nj , dj }), while
the node reports mj and cj as its cost and capacity respectively (t̂j = {mj , cj }), we get,
µ
¶
¡
¡
¡ mj ¢
nj ¢
mj ¢
mj
nj
Uj p, q,
≥ Uj p, q,
+
−
Qj q,
(6.27)
dj
cj
cj
dj
cj
From inequalities (6.26) and (6.27), we have,
µ
µ
¶
¶
¡
¡
¡ nj ¢
¡ mj ¢
nj
nj
mj
mj ¢
nj ¢
mj
−
≤ Uj p, q,
− Uj p, q,
≤
−
Qj q,
Qj q,
dj
cj
dj
cj
dj
dj
cj
cj
n

In inequality (6.28) we can distinguish two cases– if djj >
m
m
n
Qj (q, cjj ). Otherwise, we have Qj (q, cjj ) ≤ Qj (q, djj ).

mj
,
cj

(6.28)
n

then we can say that Qj (q, djj ) ≤

Notice that, essentially both inequalities (6.24) and (6.28) imply the same fact– the
fraction of traffic that a node expects to forward follows a non-increasing trend as the per
packet cost associated with the reported type increases. Also, for any node j ∈ N , if we
consider {nj , cj } and {mj , dj } as two points (types) in the domain Tj , instead of considering
{mj , cj } and {nj , dj } as two points, then we know definitively that the fraction of traffic
that j expects to forward by reporting type {nj , cj } is less than or equal to that expected
by reporting type {mj , dj }. Thus, to shape the expected utility function of a node, for
conforming it to the incentive compatibility constraint, we can consider only inequality (6.24).
Now, let

nj
cj

−

mj
dj

δj Qj (q,

= δj . Then, we can rewrite inequality (6.24) as,
¡
¢
¡
nj ¢
nj
nj
nj
) ≤ Uj p, q,
− δj − Uj p, q,
≤ δj Qj (q,
− δj )
cj
cj
cj
cj

Since Qj (·) decreases as the per packet cost associated with the type of a node increases, we
can write Qj (·) as a Riemann integral,
bZ
j /vj

nj /cj

¡
¡
nj ¢
bj ¢
Qj (q, ψj )dψj = Uj p, q,
− Uj p, q,
cj
vj
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(6.29)

which holds for all type tj ∈ Tj for any node j ∈ N . Thus, condition (2) of lemma (6.1)
follows.
Thus, (p, q) can be said to describe an optimal path auction if and only if it minimizes
Ue (p, q) subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (6.19)-(6.20), individual rationality
constraint (6.13), traffic allocation constraint (6.16), and node capacity constraint (6.17).
Next, we simplify the optimization problem presented in Section (6.1.3.3).
Lemma 6.2. (p, q) represents an optimal path auction mechanism if q minimizes


!
Z XÃ
X
FjP (tpj )


p
t
+
qi (tp ) f P (tp )dtp

j
P p
f
(t
)
j
j
j
j∈N
Tp

(6.30)

i∈P s→d

subject to constraints (6.16) and (6.17), and,
bZ
j /vj
X
X
m
j
pj (tp ) =
qi (tp ) +
qi (ψj , tp−j )dψj ,
cj
j
j
i∈P s→d

mj /cj i∈P s→d

∀j ∈ N, ∀tp ∈ T p

(6.31)

Proof. We can write the end-user’s utility function (6.11) as,


Z
Z
X
X
X
X


p
p
Ue (p, q) =
tpj
qi (tp )f P (tp )dtp +
qi (tp ) f P (tp )dtp
pj (t ) − tj
j∈N

Tp

j

i∈P s→d

j∈N

Tp

j

i∈P s→d

(6.32)
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Also, we know that,


Z
Tp



X


p
p
qi (tp ) f P (tp )dtp
pj (t ) − tj
j

i∈P s→d
bZ
j /vj

=
aj /wj
bZ
j /vj

=
aj /wj
bZ
j /vj

¡
mj ¢ P p p
f (t )dt
Uj p, q,
cj j j j




bZ
j /vj

mj /cj

Zψj

=
aj /wj aj /wj
bZ
j /vj

=
aj /wj


¡
bj ¢ P p p
Qj (q, ψj )dψj + Uj p, q,
 fj (tj )dtj
vj

¡
bj ¢
fjP (tpj )Qj (q, ψj )dtpj dψj + Uj p, q,
vj

¡
bj ¢
FjP (ψj )Qj (q, ψj )dψj + Uj p, q,
vj

bZ
j /vj

Z
FjP (tpj )

=
aj /wj

Z

=
Tp

X
j

p
T−j
i∈P s→d

¡
bj ¢
P
qi (tp )f−j
(tp−j )dtp−j dtpj + Uj p, q,
vj

¡
FjP (tpj ) X
bj ¢
p
P p
p
q
(t
)f
(t
)dt
+
U
p,
q,
i
j
p
vj
fjP (tj )
j
i∈P s→d

Substituting (6.33) into (6.32), we get,


!
Z XÃ
P p
X ¡
X
Fj (tj )
bj ¢


Ue (p, q) = 
tpj + P p
qi (tp ) f P (tp )dtp +
Uj p, q,
vj
fj (tj )
j
j∈N
j∈N
Tp

(6.33)

(6.34)

i∈P s→d

Notice that, we have accounted for the incentive compatibility constraint while simplifying
the utility function of the end-user. So the routing mechanism should be such that the
end-user’s utility as formulated in (6.34) is minimized subject to the individual rationality
constraint (6.13), traffic allocation constraint (6.16), and node capacity constraint (6.17). In
P
b
the formulation of (6.34), notice that p appears only in the last term ( j∈N Uj (p, q, vjj )) of
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the objective function. Now, rewriting (6.20) we get,


bZ
j /vj
Z
X
bj
mj X

 P p
p
Uj (p, q, ) =
qi (tp ) −
qi (ψj , tp−j )dψj  f−j
(t−j )dtp−j
pj (t ) −
vj
cj
j
j
p
T−j

mj /cj i∈P s→d

i∈P s→d

Thus, if the end-user pays a node j ∈ N according to equation (6.31), then the individual
rationality constraint (6.13) is satisfied, as well as the best possible value of the last term
in (6.34) is obtained, which is zero. The individual
rationality constraint is satisfied since
mj P
p
the payment made to a node j, pj (t ) ≥ cj
qi (tp ). Intuitively, this can also be
j
i∈P s→d
understood as follows. The per packet price associated with the type of a node j is highest
if its type is {bj , vj }. The incentive compatibility constraint dictates that as the per packet
cost associated with the type of a node decreases, the fraction of traffic that a node expects
to route follows a non-decreasing trend. Thus, if the mechanism sets the expected utility of
node j because of type {bj , vj } to zero, then the expected utility corresponding to any type
tj ∈ Tj will be greater than or equal to zero.
So we can simplify the objective function of our optimization problem to (6.30) subject
to the traffic allocation constraint and the node capacity constraint, which are the only two
constraints left to be satisfied. Thus, lemma (6.2) follows.
Next, we will formulate lemma (6.2) in a deterministic manner.
Lemma 6.3. For any given t in T , the optimal traffic allocation over different routes in
P s→d is obtained if q minimizes the following function for the corresponding tp ,

Ã
!
K
P p
X
X
Fj (tj )

tpj + P p  qi (tp )
(6.35)
Φ(tp ) =
f
(t
)
j
j
s→d
i=1
j∈Pi

subject to constraints (6.16) and (6.17). Here, Pis→d denotes the set of nodes on the ith path
in P s→d . Also, the payment made to a node j ∈ N is given by,
bZ
j /vj
X
X
m
j
pj (tp ) =
qi (tp ) +
qi (ψj , tp−j )dψj ,
cj
j
j
i∈P s→d

∀j ∈ N

(6.36)

mj /cj i∈P s→d

Proof. Clearly, for the minimization of the expected objective function given by (6.30), q
should be such that the following function gets minimized for all tp in T p (subject to (6.16)
and (6.17)),
Ã
!
X p FjP (tpj )
X
tj + P p
qi (tp )
(6.37)
f
(t
)
j
j
j
j∈N
i∈P s→d
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Now, (6.37) has been expressed as a summation over the candidate nodes available for
routing a session’s traffic, i.e., over the nodes in N . However, q has to assign traffic to the
nodes in the context of the paths in P s→d ; not by considering the nodes individually. So it
is more appropriate to express (6.37) as a summation over the paths in P s→d as has been
formulated in (6.35). Thus, lemma (6.3) follows.

6.3

Single Path Routing

Based on the theory of truthful optimal path auction design developed in the last section, we
will now devise algorithms to deploy such an auction mechanism in a network. For simplicity
of exposition we first consider a special case of the auction design problem in which each node
j ∈ N has sufficient capacity to route the sender’s traffic, i.e., we consider cj ≥ R, ∀j ∈ N ,
so that the traffic from s to d can always be routed over a single path. In Section 6.4 we
will explore implementation of the path auction mechanism in the generalized case, where
a node j ∈ N can have any arbitrary capacity, with s sending data at any arbitrary rate,
which would result in multi-path routing. Let us first define the following function,
ζj (tpj )

=

tpj

FjP (tpj )
+ P p ,
fj (tj )

∀j ∈ N

(6.38)

For any given t ∈ T , notice that ζj (tpj ) is a constant for each j ∈ N . We refer to ζj (tpj ) as the
competence factor of node j. Also, the competence factor of path i ∈ P s→d can be defined
as,
X

ζj (tpj )

j∈Pis→d
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(6.39)

Based on the above definitions and lemma (6.3), q should be such that the following function
is minimized,
Φ(tp ) =

K
X
i=1





X

ζj (tpj ) qi (tp )

(6.40)

j∈Pis→d

for all tp in T p , subject to constraint (6.16)1 .
The function q(·): Clearly, (6.40) would get minimized for any tp ∈ T p while satisfying
constraint (6.16) if q assigns all traffic to the path in P s→d having the least competence
factor, which we consider as the most competent path. In essence, the path with the
least competence factor is a path that minimizes the expected payment that the end-user has
to make to have a packet routed from s to d. We refer to such a path as the ELPR
(Expected Least Paid Route).
Formally, q should assign all traffic to path k in P s→d , such that,
X

ζj (tpj ) = min1≤i≤K

j∈Pks→d

X

ζj (tpj )

j∈Pis→d

One can find the path to which all traffic should be assigned by using the competence factor
ζj (tpj ) as the weight of node j ∈ N in the graph G and using Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the
path from s to d having the minimum competence factor, which is the shortest path w.r.t
node weights.
The function p(·): As suggested by the payment formula (6.36), a node that does not route
any traffic, i.e., is not included in the most competent path, does not receive any payment.
1

Note that constraint (6.17) need not be considered in this section since it will be always satisfied because
of the assumption on node capacity.
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This is because if tj = {mj , cj } is the type of node j not on the most competent path, then
we have

P

m

j
i∈P s→d

b

qi (ψj , tp−j ) = 0, ∀ψj ∈ [ cjj , vjj ].

On the other hand, (6.36) dictates that node j on the most competent path has to be
paid an amount equal to the cost that j would have incurred for forwarding a packet from s
if the type of j had been associated with the highest possible per packet cost that allowed j
to be included on the most competent path. Specifically, let tj be the type of node j on the
most competent path. Also, let the difference between the competence factor of the most
competent path in the graph G and that of graph G\j be ². To be included on the most
competent path in the graph G, j’s type could have corresponded to all those types in Tj for
which its competence factor did not become more than or equal to ζj (tpj ) + ². Clearly, the
highest possible per packet price that can be associated with these types is ζ −1 (ζj (tpj ) + ²).
Thus, j has to be paid the minimum of ζ −1 (ζj (tpj ) + ²) and

bj
.
vj

Based on the above argument, algorithm (7) presents the procedure for computing the
most competent path (ELPR) in G on which all traffic should be routed and the payment
to be made to each node in N .
Algorithm (7) requires finding the shortest path from s to d w.r.t node weights. This can
be done using Dijkstra’s algorithm in O(|E| + |V |log|V |) time. Clearly, the overall running
time of the algorithm is O(|E||V | + |V |2 log|V |).
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Algorithm 7 Single Path Routing– Computing Optimal Path and Payments
Require: G = (V, E); source s; destination d; t = (t1 , · · · , tn )
Ensure: Most competent path P (ELPR); Pay pj , ∀j ∈ N
1: for all j ∈ N do
m
2:
tpj ← cjj
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

F P (tp )

ζj (tpj ) ← tpj + f jP (tpj )
j
j
end for
Using ζj (tpj ) as the weight of node j ∈ N , find a path in G from s to d that has the least
competence factor. Denote the set of nodes in the selected path as P .
pj ← 0, ∀j ∈ {N \P }.
for all j ∈ P do
Using ζk (tkp ) as the weight of node k ∈ N \j, find a path in G\j from s to d with the
leastP
competence factor.
Denote the set of nodes in the selected path as S.
P
² ← j∈S ζj (tpj ) − j∈P ζj (tpj )
b
pj ← min(ζ −1 (ζj (tpj ) + ²), vjj )
end for

{0.3,0.7}

1

s

2

3

{0.4,0.5}

5

1

s

d

{0.25,0.4}

4

0.85 (0.62)

{0.45,0.75}

2

3

5
1.07 (0)

1.60 (0)

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.1: Single path routing example.
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d

1.25 (0)

4

{0.35,0.65}

1.20 (0.91)

6.3.1

An Illustrative Example

Let us look at an example to gain insight into the working of algorithm (7). The graph of
the network is shown in Figure (6.1). For the example we assume that the cost and capacity
of a node are uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Also, we consider that they are independent
random variables, so that fjM C (mj , cj ) = fjM (mj ) · fjC (cj ). The sender is assumed to be
sending data at 0.2 pkts/sec.
Given two random variables X and Y , the ratio distribution of Z = X/Y can be obtained
by integration of the following form [20],
Z+∞
f Z (z) =
|y|f XY (zy, y)dy

(6.41)

−∞

where f XY (x, y) is the joint distribution of X and Y . Based on (6.41), it can be shown that
the distribution of tpj in our example is,




1/2 0 < tpj < 1




P p
1
fj (tj ) =
tpj ≥ 1
2(tpj )2






 0
otherwise

(6.42)

In Figure (6.1(a)) the cost and capacity reported by each node is shown in brackets beside
it. The values next to a node in Figure (6.1(b)) show the competence factor (weight) of
the node (outside the bracket) and the payment received by it (inside the bracket) for each
packet served by the network. For example, the weight of node 1 is,
0.3/0.7
R

tp1

0.3
F P (tp )
+
+ P1 P1 =
0.7
f1 (t1 )
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1/2 dψj

0

1/2

= 0.85

Likewise, the weights of the other nodes has been calculated. Clearly, the ELPR comprises
of the route, s → 1 → 2 → d, since it is the path with the least competence factor in the
graph.
As noted earlier, nodes not on the ELPR does not receive any payment. The payment of
node 1 can be found as follows. With node 1 removed, the path with the lowest competence
factor in the graph is s → 3 → 2 → d, with a competence factor of 2.45. So node 1 can
report all types that does not increase its weight by more than 2.45 − 2.05 = 0.4. Now,
min(ζ −1 (0.85 + 0.4), ∞) = 0.62, which is the payment received by node 1. The payment of
node 2 can be similarly calculated.

6.4

Multiple Path Routing

We will now study the deployment of the path auction mechanism by relaxing the assumption
on node capacity. In this generalized case, based on lemma (6.3) and the definition of node
competence factor, q should be such that the following function is minimized,


K
X
X

ζj (tpj ) qi (tp )
Φ(tp ) =
i=1

j∈Pis→d

for all tp in T p subject to constraints (6.16) and (6.17).
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(6.43)

6.4.1

The Function q(·):

For any given tp ∈ T p , to find a feasible traffic allocation (one that satisfies constraint (6.16)
and (6.17)) over the paths in P s→d that minimizes (6.43) we resort to a modified version
of the Edmonds-Karp algorithm [19]. In our modified version of the algorithm we use the
competence factor of each node as its weight to find the path with the least competence
factor while searching for the augmenting path.
Algorithm 8 Multiple Path Routing– Computing Paths
Require: G = (V, E); source s; destination d; traffic rate R, t = (t1 , · · · , tn )
Ensure: Optimal traffic allocation over the paths in G (ELPR)
1: f ← 0
2: i ← 1
3: for all j ∈ N do
m
4:
tpj ← cjj
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

F P (tp )

ζj (tpj ) ← tpj + f jP (tpj )
j
j
end for
while f < R AND ∃ a path from s to d in Gf do
Using ζj (tpj ) as the weight of node j ∈ N , find a path in Gf from s to d that has the
least competence factor. Denote the set of nodes in the selected path as Pis→d .
Find node k ∈ Pis→d , such that,
cfk = minj∈Pis→d cfj

10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

r ← min(cfk , R − f )
q̃i ← r/R
cfj +r ← cfj − r, ∀j ∈ Pis→d
cfj +r ← cfj , ∀j ∈ N \Pis→d
f ←f +r
i←i+1
end while
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Algorithm (8) is our modified Edmonds-Karp algorithm that computes the optimal traffic
allocation over the paths in G. Before we delve into the details of algorithm (8) let us go
over some definitions. Given a DSA network represented by the graph G = (V, E) with
sender s and destination d and a flow f from s to d, we define the residual capacity cfj of
a node j ∈ N as the amount of additional flow that can pass via node j before exceeding
its capacity cj . Based on this we can define the residual network of G induced by f as
Gf = {V f , E f }, where
V f = {v ∈ V : cfv > 0}
E f = {(u, v) ∈ V × V : cfu > 0 and cfv > 0}
The working of algorithm (8) can be explained as follows,
1. Compute node weight: Compute the weight of each node j in N as its competence
factor ζj (tp ), based on the vector of individual types t announced by the nodes. Also,
initialize flow f from s to d to 0 and path i to 1.
2. Find an augmenting path in Gf : Find an augmenting path from s to d in Gf that
has the least competence factor and denote the set of nodes in the selected path as
Pis→d . This path can be computed by using Dijkstra’s algorithm starting from node
s. If no path can be found, then there is no feasible traffic allocation that satisfies
constraints (6.16) and (6.17) and the algorithm exits.
3. Allocate traffic to the selected path i: Find node k in Pis→d that has the least
residual capacity because of flow f from s to d. Node k is said to be the bottleneck node
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of the selected path. Clearly, min(cfk , R−f )2 is the amount of flow that can be assigned
to path i and thus the fraction of traffic allocated to path i is, q̃i = min(cfk , R − f )/R.
4. Compute new residual capacities: Update the residual capacity of each node
j ∈ Pis→d by subtracting min(cfk , R − f ) from its residual capacity cfj in Gf . The
residual capacity of all nodes not on path i is same as their residual capacity in Gf .
Then increment f by the amount of flow assigned to path i.
5. Flow allocation: If f = R, i.e., there is a flow rate R from s to d, then the optimal
traffic allocation that minimizes (6.43) satisfying constraints (6.16) and (6.17) has been
found. The optimal allocation is over the set of paths, P s→d = {P1s→d , · · · , Pis→d }, with
q̃1 to q̃i being the respective fraction of traffic over the paths. Otherwise, if f < R,
then increment i by 1 and go to STEP 2.

The augmenting paths in algorithm (8) can be found using Dijkstra’s algorithm in O(|E|+
|V |log|V |) time. Since, in every iteration of the while loop in lines 7-16 at least one node
becomes saturated, the overall running time of the algorithm is ¯(|E||V | + |V |2 log|V |).
Notice that, (6.43) can be minimized by using linear programming. However for such
a technique to navigate through the space of feasible solutions requires enumeration of all
paths from s to d, which may be computationally infeasible in practise. To reduce the
complexity of finding the optimal traffic allocation, algorithm (8) essentially progresses by
minimizing subproblems of the original optimization problem, that can be solved in polynoNote that, if min(cfk , R − f ) = R − f , then i is necessarily the last augmenting path needed to allocate
the flow rate R from s to d.
2
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mial time using Dijkstras, and finally combines the individual solutions to obtain the feasible
traffic allocation that minimizes (6.43). We will next state and prove the following theorem
regarding the optimality of the allocation provided by algorithm (8).
Theorem 6.1. Given the existence of feasible traffic allocations, the solution provided by
algorithm (8) minimizes (6.43) among all such feasible allocations.
Proof. Without loss of generality let us assume that the set of paths P s→d = {P1s→d , · · · , PKs→d }
is indexed in non-decreasing order of their competence factors. Then, for a given t ∈ T , let
the traffic allocation over the K paths in P s→d as computed by algorithm (8) be represented
0
by the vector q = (q1 , · · · , qK )3 . Also, let q 0 = (q10 , · · · , qK
) denote any feasible traffic allocas→d
tion over the set of K paths in P
for the same vector of individual types t. Further, let k
s→d
be the highest index of a path in P
which has a non-zero fraction of traffic assigned to it
in q and let k 0 be the highest index of a path in P s→d which has a non-zero fraction of traffic
assigned to it in q 0 . Notice that, in the representation of algorithm (8)’s traffic allocation as
the vector q, we consider the case of algorithm (8) not encountering a path while assigning
traffic, due to the path’s bottleneck capacity being zero, by considering that the algorithm
assigns 0 traffic to it.
To show that q minimizes (6.43) we will show that the value of the function Φ(·) obtained
using q 0 cannot be less than that obtained using q. Clearly, for q 0 to provide a lower value of
the function Φ(·), k 0 has to be less than or equal to k. Given that q is a feasible allocation,
we will first prove that k 0 can never be less than k. Next, we will show that, when k 0 = k,
even then q 0 cannot yield a lower value of the function Φ(·) than q.
Case 1- k 0 < k: We will prove that k 0 < k is not possible by contradiction. For the sake
of argument assume that k 0 < k. This implies that there has to be at least one path, say w,
in [2, k 0 ] such that qw0 > qw ≥ 0. Since qw0 > qw , it has to be the case that both the following
are true,
• Path w intersects at some node(s) with at least one path in [1, w − 1].
• The bottleneck node(s) on path w, after algorithm (8) assigned traffic to path w − 1,
must correspond to one (or some) of the nodes that w has in common with the paths
in [1, w − 1].
Based on the above arguments, clearly, the residual capacity of at least one node that w
has in common with the path(s) in [1, w − 1] must be 0 after algorithm (8) assigns traffic to
w4 . Let us consider one such node and denote it as j ∗ . Also, let W be the set of paths in
For clarity, if path x in P s→d corresponds to path x0 in P s→d , i.e., Pxs→d = Pxs→d
then qx0 = q̃x
0
It is worth emphasizing here that the residual capacity of a node on path w, that is not in common with
any path in [1, w − 1], cannot be zero after algorithm (8) assigns traffic to w.
3

4
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[1, w − 1] that traverse via node j ∗ and let qw0 − qw = ². For q 0 to be a feasible allocation, the
following constraint must hold,
X
X
qi −
qi0 ≥ ²
(6.44)
Next we claim that,

Pw

i=1 qi

≥

Pw

i∈W

0
i=1 qi .

i∈W

We will prove this by mathematical induction.

Base Case: Let w0 be the lowest indexed path in [1, k 0 ] such that qw0 0 > qw0 (note that w0
cannot be 1). Let qw0 0 − qw0 = ²0 . Because of constraint (6.44) we can state that,
0 −1
w
X

=⇒

qi ≥

0 −1
w
X

i=1

i=1

w0
X

w
X

qi0 + ²0

0

qi ≥

i=1

qi0

i=1

This proves the base case.
Inductive Step: Let w0 be the index of a path in [1, k 0 ] such that qw0 0 > qw0 . Also, let w00 in
[1, k 0 ] be the index of the first path after w0 such that qw0 00 > qw00 and let qw0 00 − qw00 = ²00 . Let
P 0
Pw 0 0
the hypothesis hold for w0 , i.e., assume that w
i=1 qi ≥
i=1 qi . Then, we have,
0

w
X
i=1

qi +

00 −1
wX

0

qi ≥

w0 +1

w
X

qi0

+

00 −1
wX

qi0 + ²00

(6.45)

w0 +1

i=1

The validity of (6.45) can be explained as follows. The first term on the LHS in greater than
or equal to the first term on the RHS since we have assumed that the hypothesis holds for
w0 . The second term on the LHS is greater than or equal to the second term on the RHS
since qi0 ≤ qi , ∀i ∈ [w0 + 1, w00 − 1]. Also, (6.44) dictates that there has to be a set of paths,
say W 00 , which is a subset of the paths in [1, w00 − 1], for which the total fraction of traffic
allocated to the paths in W 00 in q 0 is at least ²00 less than that allocated to the paths in W 00
in q. Thus inequality (6.45) holds. Adding qw00 to both sides of (6.45) yields,
00

w
X

00

qi ≥

i=1

w
X

qi0

(6.46)

i=1

This completes the induction step and proves our hypothesis. Notice that, (6.46) implies
P0
P0
that ki=1 qi ≥ ki=1 qi0 . However, this is clearly a contradiction. Thus, k 0 can never be less
than k.
Case 2 - k 0 = k: Notice that, when k 0 = k it is not possible that every qi0 < qi , ∀i ∈ [1, k] or
every qi0 > qi , ∀i ∈ [1, k]. Thus only two cases are possible– either every qi0 = qi , ∀i ∈ [1, k]
or qi0 > qi for some (not all) i ∈ [1, k]. For the latter case, if there is a path w in [1, k] for
which qw0 > qw , then because of (6.44) the value of function (6.43) yielded by q 0 will be clearly
greater than or equal to that yielded by q. Thus, we can say that q minimizes (6.43).
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6.4.2

The Function p(·)

According to (6.36), a node that does not route any traffic does not receive any payment. In
computing the payment for node j that forwards a non-zero fraction of traffic, the difficulty
lies in evaluating the integral term of (6.36). To compute this integration we will make
use of the fact that, given t−j , the fraction of traffic forwarded by j is a (decreasing) step
function of per packet cost associated with its type domain. Thus, to compute the integral,
the fraction of traffic that j forwards has to be evaluated only at the points of discontinuity
of the step function.
For a given t−j , algorithm (9) computes the payment to be received by node j in an
iterative manner by finding a partial payment to be received by the node in each iteration
and summing the partial payments progressively to finally compute the total payment to be
received by j. Let Zi denote the competence factor of path i in G. Let us consider a node j
that routes traffic. To compute j’s payment the algorithm iterates on the while loop in lines
6-16. Before the iterations start, the algorithm initializes j’s payment, pj , to tpj ·

P
j

i∈P s→d

q̃i ,

which corresponds to the first term of (6.36). Also, the set P 0s→d is initialized to P s→d and
the set q̃ 0 to q̃. Let us now consider how the algorithm computes the partial payment of j in
an iteration. Let,
² ← min

j

i∈P 0 s→d

(Zi∗ − Zi ),

where i∗ is the first path in G having a competence factor greater than that of i and that
does not pass via j. Clearly, j will receive

P
j

i∈P 0 s→d
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q̃i0 fraction of traffic as long as it does

not report a type that increases its competence factor, ζj (tpj ), by ² or more. Since j does not
report a type whose per packet cost is more than bj /vj , thus, the highest per packet cost
that can be associated with the type of j so that j still receives the same fraction of traffic
is,
t̂pj ← min(ζ −1 (ζj (tpj ) + ²),

bj
)
vj

Thus, the partial payment of j computed in the iteration is,
(t̂pj − tpj )

X

q̃i0

j

i∈P 0 s→d

Notice that, t̂pj and tpj are essentially two consecutive points of discontinuity of the step
function mentioned before. The algorithm then updates the payment of j by adding the
partial payment calculated to the previously computed payment for j. Now, if t̂pj =

bj
,
vj

then

we have completed computing the integral term of (6.36) and the algorithm breaks from the
iterative loop for calculating j’s payment. Otherwise, tpj is updated to t̂pj and algorithm (8)
is invoked with the type vector (t̂j , t−j ), such that the per packet price associated with t̂j is
t̂pj (computed above), to find the new set of optimal paths as P 0s→d and its corresponding
traffic allocation vector as q̃ 0 . The iterations continue until the highest possible per packet
price (less than equal to bj /vj ) that can be associated with the type of j for j to receive a
non-zero fraction of traffic is found.
For each node j that routes traffic, if the fraction of traffic function of j has d points of
discontinuity, then algorithm (8) has to be invoked d times for computing the payment of j.
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Algorithm 9 Multiple Path Routing– Computing Payments
Require: Optimal set of paths P s→d over which traffic should be routed; vector q̃ of traffic
fraction over the paths in P s→d .
Ensure: pj , ∀j ∈ N S
1: pj ← 0, ∀j ∈ {N \ i∈P s→d Pis→d }
S
2: for all j ∈ i∈P s→d Pis→d do
P
3:
pj ← tpj ·
qi
j
s→d
i∈P

4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

15:
16:
17:

P 0s→d ← P s→d
q̃ 0 ← q̃ P
while
q̃ 0 > 0 do
j
0 s→d i
i∈P

∗
² ← min 0 s→d
j (Zi∗ − Zi ), where i is the first path in G having a competence factor
i∈P
greater than or equal to that of i and that does not pass via j.
b
t̂pj ← min(ζ −1 (ζj (tpj ) + ²), vjj )
P
pj ← pj + (t̂pj − tpj )
q̃ 0
j
0 s→d i
b

i∈P

if t̂pj = vjj then
break;
else
tpj = t̂pj
Invoke algorithm (8), with tpj as the per packet cost associated with the type of
node j, to find the optimal set of paths as P 0s→d and the corresponding fraction
of traffic as the vector q̃ 0 .
end if
end while
end for
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Thus, the time complexity of finding j’s payment is O(d|E||V | + d|V |2 log|V |). Consequently,
the payment of all nodes that route traffic can be found in O(d|E||V |2 + d|V |3 log|V |) time.

6.4.3

Who Pays the Nodes?

We have established that in our path auction mechanism no node has an incentive to dishonestly report its cost or capacity. However, there still exists the following loophole in
the mechanism if it is the sender who pays the nodes– node j honestly announces its type,
receives payment for the fraction of traffic it has been made responsible for forwarding but
simply drops the packets instead of forwarding them. To discourage nodes from exhibiting
such dropping behavior we make the destination node make the payment to each intermediate node for every packet it receives. In this case, if a node drops a packet the destination
will not receive the packet and the node will consequently not receive payment for it. Thus,
no node will have an unilateral incentive to drop any fraction of traffic.

6.4.4

An Illustrative Example

To gain insight into how algorithm (8) and (9) finds the optimal set of paths over which to
route traffic and calculates payment of the nodes that route traffic, let us study an example.
Figure (6.2) shows the graph of the network. We again assume that cost and capacity of
the nodes are independent random variables, with each being uniformly distributed over
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Figure 6.2: Multi-path routing example.
[0,1]. The sender inputs data at 0.7 pkts/sec. The distribution of tpj for each node j is given
by (6.42).
The cost and capacity of a node has been shown beside it in Figure 6.2(a). Figure 6.2(b)
shows the competence factor (weight) of a node (outside bracket) and the payment received
by it (inside bracket) for each packet served by the network. The weights of the nodes
have been found similar to the example in Section 6.3.1 and we will not discuss it here.
After the weight calculations, algorithm 8 finds the path with the least competence factor
(shortest path w.r.t node weights) in the network and saturates the path. This path is
s → 1 → 2 → d, which is allocated 0.45/0.7=0.64 fraction of traffic. Notice that, node
2 saturates in the process. Next, node 2 is disconnected from the network and the path
with the least competence factor is found in the residual network. This yields the path
s → 4 → 5 → d, which is allocated 0.25/0.7=0.36 fraction of traffic.

128

Next, let us consider node 2 and see how its payment is calculated. Notice that, node 2
will receive 0.64 fraction of traffic until it reports a type which makes the competence factor
of path s → 1 → 2 → d (1.68) greater than or equal to that of path s → 4 → 5 → d
(2.34), in which case it will get 0 traffic. Now, the maximum per packet price that can
be associated with the reported type of node 2 for it to receive 0.64 fraction of traffic is
min(ζ −1 (0.88 + 0.66), ∞) = 0.77. So the payment received by node 2 is,
0.2
)
0.45

0.2
0.45

· 0.64 + (0.77 −

· 0.64 + 0 = 0.49. The payment of the other nodes is similarly calculated.

6.5

Summary

The problem of routing in DSA networks, where each secondary node has a privately known
cost and capacity, is complicated by the fact that each node can potentially improve its utility
by dishonestly reporting its type to the routing mechanism. In the absence of techniques
to induce nodes for truthfully reporting their cost and capacity to the routing mechanism,
there may be an unnecessary overpayment of incentives provided to the nodes for routing
traffic. We design a path auction based routing scheme for DSA networks that can enforce
honest revealing of cost and capacity to be a dominant strategy for every node in the path
auction game. Furthermore, our mechanism also minimizes the payment that needs to be
given to the nodes that forward traffic, making our scheme attractive to the end-user. By
considering capacity constraint of the nodes we explicitly support multiple path routing. For
deploying our routing mechanism in DSA networks, we present polynomial time algorithms
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for computing the optimal route over which to route traffic and the payment to be received
by each node.
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CHAPTER 7
SIMULATION RESULTS
In this chapter, we conduct simulations to validate the design philosophy and study the
effectiveness of all our proposed algorithms.

7.1

Spectrum Bargaining in Complete Conflict Graphs

In this section, we will analyze the results obtained in Chapter 4 using numerical analysis
to get a better insight into the equilibrium channel share of the players.

7.1.1

Channel Share Convergence

We will show numerically that the SPNE shares of a 2-player finite horizon bargaining
game indeed converges when the game is played with a large horizon (refer Section 4.2).
Figure 7.1 shows the SPNE shares of a 2-player finite horizon game with varying number
of game periods. The number of available channels M have been taken to be 25, while the
discount factor of the players δ has been set at 0.95. The SPNE share of the players have
been computed using the perfect equilibrium strategies derived in Section 4.2.1 for a finite
horizon game. As can be seen from the figure, as the number of period increases, each player
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Figure 7.1: SPE shares of a 2 player game against varying number of game periods. Here
M = 25 and δ = 0.95.

starts getting a more fair share of the channels. For example, when the game is played for
only one period, one of the players (the one making the offer) gets 24 channels while the
other one gets only 1 channel. In the 2 period game, however, one player gets 23 channels
(the player receiving the offer in the first period) and the other one gets 2 channels. And so
on. Finally, beyond period 70, the SPNE shares of the two players converges to an equal split
of the channel between the players. This validates the observation we made in Section 4.3.2,
that for δ close to one, each player tends to get an equal share of the channels in the infinite
horizon game. Note that, when channel share of the players converge, one of the players gets
13 channels, while the other one gets 12 channels. This is because the number of channels
available in this case (M = 25) is not equally divisible between the 2 players. However, if
M/N is an integer, then each player gets an exactly equal share as the others in the infinite
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Figure 7.2: SPE shares of a 2 player game against varying number of game periods. Here
M = 24 and δ = 0.95.

horizon game. This is shown in Figure (7.2), which considers that there are 24 available
channels.
It is worth mentioning here that, as noted earlier, the 2 players do not have to play
all the periods to find what the SPNE share of the players converges to. It can be found
from their closed from expressions in equations (4.22) and (4.23). Knowing their infinite
horizon equilibrium shares in the very first period, rational players will play their equilibrium
strategies and play will also end in the very first period.
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7.1.2

Variation of Fairness

Fairness is concerned with the relative utility of the nodes competing for the M channels.
To study the relative utility the players get as a result of the competition process, from a
system wide perspective, we use Jain’s fairness index [35]. Recall that, in the infinite horizon
game, if {xi |1 ≤ i ≤ N } is accepted in period t, then the utility (payoff) of player i is δ t xi ,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor of the players1 . Thus, if {xti |1 ≤ i ≤ N } is accepted
in period t, then we can define fairness in terms of the utilities (payoffs) of the players as
follows.

P
t
2
( N
i=1 δ xi )
F =
P
t
2
N· N
i=1 (δ xi )

(7.1)

Now, recall that we derive the infinite horizon SPNE strategy of the players (refer Section 4.3), which all rational players will play in the first period (t = 0) of the game. Thus,
the payoff of Pi (i ∈ [1, N ]) will be δ 0 xi = xi . Based on this we simplify (7.1) as follows.
P
P
0
2
2
( N
( N
i=1 δ xi )
i=1 xi )
F =
PN 0 2 =
P
2
N · i=1 (δ xi )
N· N
i=1 (xi )

(7.2)

The fairness index defined above is bounded between 0 and 1. More the players tend to
equally distribute the channels among themselves, fairness approaches 1. Also, if one node
acquires all the channels, fairness becomes 1/N , which is 0 in the limit N → ∞.
Figure 7.3 shows how fairness varies with the discount factor, δ. The number of nodes
N have been taken to be 30, while M is set at 55. Fairness has been calculated using the
index defined in (7.2). As can be seen from the figure, as δ increases, i.e, as the players
1

Note that, here xi denotes the number of channels that Pi gets in the sharing rule.
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Figure 7.3: Variation of fairness with discount factor δ. Here, N = 30, M = 55
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become more patient, system level fairness increases. This is because, as the players become
increasingly more patient, no player can outlast the other players by waiting to get a larger
share. Thus, the channels start getting more and more fairly apportioned among the players.
Figure 7.4 shows the variation of fairness with number of channels. The number of nodes
N have been taken to be 30, while the discount factor of the players δ is set at 0.95. Notice
that, at values of M where M/N is an integer value (i.e, at M = xN , where x = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
etc), fairness becomes very close to 1. This is because all players being patient in the infinite
horizon game (δ = 0.95), the players’ SPNE strategies tend to equally divide the available
channels among them. At values of M where M/N is not an integer, fairness falls below
1, since all players cannot possibly get an equal share. Between xN and (x + 1)N fairness
falls to a local minimum and then again starts approaching 1 as M approaches (x + 1)N .
Moreover, note that, as M increases, the local minimum of fairness between xN and (x+1)N
starts increasing. This is because as more channels get available, the relative discrepancy
among the channel allocation of different nodes start decreasing.

7.2

Spectrum Bargaining in Arbitrary Conflict Graphs

In this section, we conduct simulations to study how the “self-gain” maximizing strategy
of the players impact system wide performance. For simulations, we assume a noiseless,
immobile radio network. The conflict graph of the network has been generated randomly
for a given graph density. Note that, conflict graph density depends on the transmission
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power (and hence interference range) of the secondary users. Higher the transmit power of
nodes, larger will be their interference range. Hence, graph density of the conflict graph will
increase. Also, in our simulations we assume that all players have an equal discount factor.

7.2.1

System Utility

If {xti |1 ≤ i ≤ N } is accepted in period t, then we can define system utilities in terms of the
payoffs of the players as follows.
• Sum Utility: This considers the total system utility regardless of fairness.
Usum =

N
X

Ri =

i=1

N
X

δit |xti |

(7.3)

i=1

• Minimum Utility: This considers the utility of the player with the least payoff.
Umin = min1≤i≤N Ri = min1≤i≤N δit |xti |

(7.4)

• Proportional Fairness based Utility [49]:
Uf air =

N
X

log(Ri ) =

i=1

N
X

log(δit |xti |)

(7.5)

i=1

To make it comparable to Umin and Usum , we modify the fairness utility to:
!1/N
ÃN
!1/N Ã N
Y
Y
t t
=
δi |xi |
Uf air =
Ri

(7.6)

i=1

i=1

Now, Algorithm 6 finds the infinite horizon SPNE strategy of P1 in the first period (t = 0)
of the game, which all rational players in P−1 will accept. Thus, the payoff of Pi (i ∈ [1, N ])
will be Ri = δi0 |x0i | = |x0i |. Based on this we simplify the metrics defined above as follows.
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• Uf air : We use proportional fairness based system utility as defined in (7.6). Based on
the above argument Uf air becomes,
v
uN
uY
1/N
Uf air = t δi0 |x0i | =
i=1

v
uN
uY
1/N
t |x0 |
i

(7.7)

i=1

Notice that, Uf air = 0 if there is any |x0i | = 0, i ∈ [1, N ]. Thus, this metric will also
help capture whether any node gets starved of channels.
• Umean : We use mean utility instead of sum utility (7.3) in our simulations, so that all
three utilities are within the same scale,
Umean

N
N
N
1 X
1 X 0 0
1 X 0
=
Ri =
δ |x | =
|x |
N i=1
N i=1 i i
N i=1 i

(7.8)

• Umin : We use minimum utility as defined in equation (7.4). Umin becomes,
Umin = min1≤i≤N Ri = min1≤i≤N |xti |

7.2.2

(7.9)

Impact of the Number of Channels (M)

Figures 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 show how the three utilities vary with the number of available
channels, M . We consider a 8 node (player) network, with each player having a discount
factor of 0.7. Figure 7.5 shows how Uf air varies with M . As can be seen from the figure,
proportional fairness increases with the number of available channels. The graph also shows
the impact of graph density on Uf air . For a given M (and N ), Uf air decreases as graph
density increases. Increasing graph density creates additional interference constraints. Thus,
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Figure 7.5: Fairness with varying number of available channels.
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Figure 7.6: Mean utility with varying number of available channels.
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the average vertex degree in the conflict graph increases and each node tends to get lesser
number of channels. Therefore, Uf air scales inversely with graph density.
Figure 7.6 shows the average number of channels received by the nodes. As M increases,
Umean increases. Also, as graph density increases, for a given M and N , Umean decreases due
to the increase in average vertex degree. Figure 7.10 shows the minimum number of channels
received by a node (Umin ) as M increases. Umin increases as more channels become available.
Since, Umin never falls below 1, no node is ever “starved” in the solution produced by our
bargaining approach. This can also be noted from Figure (7.5). Moreover, the minimum
value of Umin is 1 because we have considered that a player has to be offered at least 1
channel to make him accept an offer in the last period (Section 5.2). Generally speaking,
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Figure 7.8: Fairness with varying number of Secondary Users.

our bargaining framework can be tailored to provide application specific minimum level of
QoS.

7.2.3

Impact of the Number of Secondary users (N)

Figures 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10 show how the three utilities degrade with increasing number of
secondary nodes, N . The conflict graphs has been randomly generated with a graph density
of 0.5. The discount factor of all players is 0.8. Figure 7.8 shows how proportional fairness
based system utility, Uf air , vary with N . As N increases, Uf air decreases. This is because, as
N increases (for a given graph density), more interference constraints are produced, thereby
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Figure 7.10: Minimum utility with varying number of Secondary Users.
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increasing average vertex degree in the conflict graph. As average vertex degree increases,
and M remains fixed, each node tends to get lesser number of channels. Thus, Uf air is
inversely proportional to the number of secondary users, N . As expected, for a given N and
graph density, when more channels become available, Uf air increases.
Figure 7.9 plots the mean number of channels received by a node, Umean , with varying
number of secondary users, N . Umean degrades with increasing N , due to the increase in
average vertex degree in the conflict graph. As M increases, for a given N and graph density,
each node on an average gets more channels. Note that, the rate of decrease of Umean reduces
with increasing N , i.e., Umean tends to saturate around a minimum value for large N . This
behavior can be more pronouncedly seen when the number of channels available is 10.
Figure 7.10 shows how the minimum number of channels received by any node, Umin ,
degrades with increasing N . As can be seen, Umin never falls below 1 (because of reasons
explained for Figure 7.7) for any number of secondary users.

7.2.4

Impact of Graph Density

As noted earlier, conflict graph density depends on the transmission power (and hence interference range) of the secondary users. Higher the transmit power of nodes, larger will be
their interference range and thus larger will be the number of interference constraints. Hence,
graph density of the conflict graph will increase. Higher transmit power leads to improved
spectrum utilization for secondary users who are distant from primary users. However, this
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Figure 7.11: Fairness with varying conflict graph density.

also leads to additional interference constraints and reduced possibility of spectrum sharing.
Hence, there exists a tradeoff between improving spectrum utilization and degrading spectrum sharing. We will see how conflict graph density (or in effect the transmission power of
nodes) affect spectrum sharing by the secondary users by studying the three system utilities.
Figures 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13 show how the three utilities degrade as conflict graph density
increases. The number of channels available, M , was set to 15 and the discount factor of all
players in 0.8. From Figure 7.11 it can be clearly seen that Uf air degrades with increasing
graph density for a fixed number of secondary users, N . This is again because the average
vertex degree of the conflict graph increases with increasing graph density. For a given graph
density, as N decreases, average vertex degree decreases, and thus Uf air increases for fixed
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M . Note that, when graph density is 1, we have a complete graph on N vertices, i.e, all
nodes are within the interference range of each other. In this case, when N is 15, all nodes
get a channel each (recall M = 15) and thus Uf air becomes 1.
Figure 7.12 plots Umean with varying graph density. As can be seen, Umean decreases with
increasing graph density due to the increase in average vertex degree. Again, when N is 15
with a graph density of 1, Umean becomes 1. Figure 7.13 shows the degradation of Umin with
increasing graph density.
Note that the spectrum reusing capability of the network deteriorates more rapidly with
increasing graph density (transmit power) for a fixed number of secondaries than it degrades
with increasing number of secondary users for a fixed graph density. This can be seen by
comparing the graphs showing the variation of Uf air and Umean with graph density with their
respective counterparts in Section 7.2.3.

7.2.5

Impact of Discount Factor

In Figure 7.14, the y-axis corresponds to the number of periods, T , of a finite horizon
bargaining game of N players at which algorithm 6 finds |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj | = |(x01 , x0−1 )Tj −1 |, ∀j ∈
[1, N ], i.e., the period T at which the SPNE strategy of P1 converges, thus corresponding
to his strategy in the infinite horizon game, (x01 , x0−1 )∞ . The x-axis corresponds to varying
discount factor, δ, of the players. Conflict graph density has been taken to be 0.6 and the
number of channels available, M , is 14. As can be seen from the figure, T scales inversely
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discount factor of players.
with 1 − δ. This is because, as the discount factor of the players increases, the players
become more patient in waiting for the bargaining outcome. When δ is 1, the players can
wait infinitely long for the bargaining outcome. Moreover, it can also be noted that T
increases as the ratio of N : M increases. This can be clearly seen, since, T for any given
discount factor is least for

N
M

=

10
,
14

increases when

observations corroborate (5.9).
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7.3

Incentive Based Routing

We will now evaluate the performance of the incentive based routing mechanism proposed
in Chapter 6 via simulations. We will primarily focus on the effectiveness of our proposed
algorithms in saving payment, since it is the central design criteria of our path auction
mechanism. For the purpose of simulations, nodes (in N ) have been randomly placed in a
1000 × 1000 m2 area, with the source s and destination d being placed near two opposite
corners of the square. In the simulations we assume that mj and cj are independent random
variables, i.e., fjM C = fjM · fjC . For each node j ∈ N , its cost mj has been assumed to
be uniformly distributed over [1, 4] and its capacity cj has been assumed to be uniformly
distributed over [2, 7]. All results have been averaged over 1000 independent runs.
We will first compare the performance of our algorithm with LCP routing (refer Section 2.3.3.1). However, since LCP routing has been developed only for the single path
routing scenario, we will use our algorithms for the same from Section 6.3 for the purpose
of comparison. Moreover, in LCP the type of a node corresponds to the per packet cost it
owes to its primary spectrum holder for transmitting a packet over its spectrum. Thus, we
consider that in LCP routing a node declares its type to the routing mechanism as tpj . In
Section 7.3.2 we will delve into the dynamics of the generalized (multi-path) routing scenario.

148

7.3.1

Single Path Routing

In the single path routing scenario, it has been assumed that s injects data at 2 pkts/sec for
all the experiments.

7.3.1.1

Varying Transmission Radius

Average cost and payment of route
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Figure 7.15: Variation of cost and payment with transmission radius of the nodes.

For Figures 7.15, 7.16 and 7.17, the number of nodes have been taken to be 200. Figure 7.15 shows how the cost of ELPR and LCP route and their corresponding payment
decreases with increasing transmission radius of the nodes. The cost of a route refers to the
summation of the costs incurred by the nodes on the route for each packet routed by the

149

45

Percentage of different routes

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
150

200

250

300

350

400

Transmission radius of nodes (m)

Figure 7.16: Percentage of routes for which ELPR and LCP are different.

network. Similarly, the payment of a route is the summation of the payments received by
the nodes on the route (for each packet routed by the network). As the transmission radius
of the nodes increase, the path length (hop count) tends to decrease, thereby resulting in
paths of lower cost to which lesser payments has to be made. Note that, the cost of ELPR
is only slightly larger than that of LCP. This implies that, as expected, ELPR is a route of
relatively low cost, but not necessarily the route with the lowest cost. Further, the payment
needed for ELPR is slightly less than that needed for LCP. This shows that ELPR can enforce truthfulness on both cost and capacity reporting of a node while requiring a payment
that is less than that required by LCP, which only ensures truthful cost reporting. Note that
the saving in payment by ELPR against LCP is more pronounced at lower transmission
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radius. This is because the total savings over the intermediate hops become more and more
significant as the number of hops increases.
Figure 7.16 shows the percentage of cases (in the 1000 independent runs) in which ELPR
and LCP were different routes, with varying transmission radius of the nodes. As can
be seen from the figure, the percentage of cases in which ELPR and LCP were different
routes decrease with increasing transmission radius of the nodes. This implies that, as the
transmission radius increases, or in other words as the path length decreases, the chances of
the path with the minimum cost being also the path that minimizes the expected payment

Average cost, weight and payment of route
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Figure 7.17: Variation of cost, weight and payment of ELPR with average path length.
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In Figure 7.17 we plot how the cost, weight and payment of ELPR varies with average
number of hops. The number of hops has been affected by varying the transmission radius
of the nodes. Here, the weight of ELPR refers to its competence factor. As expected, all
three factors increase with the number of hops.
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Figure 7.18: Variation of cost and payment with number of nodes in the network.

7.3.1.2

Varying number of nodes

Figure 7.18 shows how the cost of ELPR and LCP route and their corresponding payments
decrease as the total number of nodes is increased. The transmission radius of a node was
set at 250 m. As the number of nodes is increased, the number of alternative paths between
sender and destination increases and thus both ELPR and LCP starts corresponding to
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lower and lower cost routes. Accordingly, the payment needed for the routes also follows a
decreasing trend. It can again be noted that the cost of ELPR is slightly larger than that of
LCP, while the payment required for ELPR is slightly lower than that required by LCP. This
fact indicates that there is a tradeoff between achieving social efficiency and minimizing the
payment required for a route to maintain truthfulness. LCP attains the socially desirable
solution by corresponding to the path having the minimum cost, while ELPR sacrifices a
little social efficiency in order to minimize the payment to be made by the end-user. Note
that the saving in payment by ELPR is more significant when the number of nodes is less.
This is because of fewer alternative paths at lower number of nodes. When the number of
alternative paths is less, the difference of cost (competence factor) between the best and the
second best path for LCP (ELPR) tends to be higher than when the number of alternative
paths is more. Now, since VCG does not have an upper limit for payment to a node,
LCP requires a more higher payment than ELPR, when the number of alternative paths is
relatively lesser.

7.3.2

Multi-path Routing

We now consider our path auctions in a generalized setting, i.e., s can inject data at any arbitrary rate, which would result in multiple path routing. To gain insight into the advantage
of using ELPR we will again weigh it again LCP. However, as noted earlier, LCP routing can
only be used in a network where every node has sufficient capacity to forward the sender’s
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Figure 7.19: Variation of cost and payment with input rate R.

traffic. Thus, to use LCP routing we will disconnect each node j from the network at hand
for which cj < R. For completeness, we will also use ELPR routing is such a scenario (nodes
with insufficient capacity removed). To distinguish between the cases of single path and
multi-path routing for ELPR, we will refer to the former as ELPRS and to the latter as
ELPRM.

7.3.2.1

Varying input rate R

Figure 7.19 shows how the cost of ELPRM, ELPRS and LCP route and their corresponding
payments increase with increasing data input rate R. The number of nodes was taken to be
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Figure 7.20: Average number of paths used for different input rates.

150 and the transmission radius of the nodes was set at 250 m. As can be clearly seen from
the figure, the cost and the payment of ELPRM is considerably lesser than the other two.
Also, note that, after disconnecting nodes with insufficient capacity, the network was unable
to accommodate flows demanding a rate greater than 6 pkts/sec. This emphasizes the fact
that ELPRM can support higher data rate applications by distributing the input load over
multiple paths. It is also worth noting that the increase in cost and payment of ELPRM
with R is much more gradual than those of ELPRS and LCP.
Intuitively, as the input rate R is increased, ELPRM would start distributing the load
over more number of paths. This is shown in Figure 7.20, which plots the average number
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Figure 7.21: Variation of cost and payment with number of nodes in the network.

of paths used by ELPRM (over the 1000 runs) with varying R. As can can seen from the
figure, the number of paths used by ELPRM increases with the input rate.

7.3.2.2

Varying number of nodes

Figure 7.21 shows how the cost of ELPRM, ELPRS and LCP route and their corresponding
payments decrease with increasing number of nodes. The transmission radius of the nodes
was set at 250 m with s sending data at 5 pkts/sec. The decrease in cost of the three different
types of routes and their corresponding payment can be attributed to the increase in number
of alternative paths as the number of nodes increases. Clearly, the figure suggests that the
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Figure 7.22: Variation of cost and payment with transmission radius of nodes.

cost and payment of ELPRM fare best among the three. Also, the saving in payment by
ELPRM is more pronounced at lower number of nodes which is in line with our observation
and reasoning for Figure 7.18. Note that, the decreasing nature of the cost of the three
different types of routes and their associated payments tend to saturate when the number
of nodes becomes high, or in other words as the number of alternative paths become large.
Thus, though increase in competition (with increase in number of alternative paths) tends to
bring down both the cost and required payment (for all three type of routes) the net utility
of the end-user tends to level off when the number of competitors is considerably large– a
phenomenon typically seen in a market with perfect competition.
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7.3.2.3

Varying transmission radius

Figure 7.22 shows how the cost of ELPRM, ELPRS and LCP route and their corresponding
payments decrease with increasing transmission radius of the nodes. The number of nodes
was taken to be 150 with the source sending data at 5 pkts/sec. As can be noted from the
figure, ELPRM again fares best among the three. The saving in payment by ELPR (for
both single and multi path cases) is more pronounced at lower transmission radius, which
corroborates our observation in Figure 7.15.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we first addressed the problem of dynamic channel access by a set of
cognitive radio enabled nodes, where each node acting in a selfish manner tries to access and
use as many channels as possible, subject to the interference constraints. We modeled this
problem as an infinite horizon bargaining game where the nodes bargain among themselves
regarding their share of channels. First, we explored the finite horizon version of the bargaining game and presented polynomial time algorithms to find the Pareto optimal SPNE
strategy of the player making the offer in the first period of the game. This is a strategy,
such that, neither can the player making the offer increase his utility by making any other
offer, nor can the players receiving the offer gain in any subsequent period by rejecting this
offer. Next, we extended the results from the finite horizon game to find the Pareto optimal SPNE strategies of the infinite horizon game. Using simulations we studied how the
selfish strategies of the players affect spectrum usage from a system wide perspective. As
suggested by theory as well as simulations, in our bargaining solution, no player gets starved
of channels. Furthermore, since in the bargaining model nodes negotiate among themselves,
no centralized controller is needed.

159

Secondly, in this dissertation, we also studied the implications of the price the secondary
nodes have to pay to primary spectrum owners for acquiring channels. To forward traffic,
each secondary node would incur a cost because of using the spectrum it has acquired by
paying a price. Moreover, using the acquired spectrum, each node can sustain a certain
capacity. Clearly, secondary nodes will not have an incentive to relay traffic unless they are
compensated for the costs they incur in forwarding traffic. Also, for a routing mechanism
to be stable, the amount of traffic that a node forwards should not exceed its capacity. The
problem of routing is further complicated by the fact that each node can potentially improve
its utility by dishonestly reporting its type to the routing mechanism. In the absence of
techniques to induce nodes for truthfully reporting their cost and capacity to the routing
mechanism, there may be an unnecessary overpayment of incentives provided to the nodes
for routing traffic. We designed a path auction based routing scheme for DSA networks
that can enforce honest revealing of cost and capacity to be a dominant strategy for every
node in the path auction game. Furthermore, our mechanism also minimizes the payment
that needs to be given to the nodes that forward traffic, making our scheme attractive to
the end-user. By considering capacity constraint of the nodes we explicitly support multiple
path routing. For deploying our routing mechanism in DSA networks, we present polynomial
time algorithms for computing the optimal route over which to route traffic and the payment
to be received by each node. Simulation results suggest that our path auction mechanism
can ensure truthfulness on both cost and capacity while making a payment less than that
required for VCG based LCP routing.
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